THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO
RECENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FAILURES –
WILL IT BE EFFECTIVE?
JOHN L. LATHAM1
Introduction
The thrust of my talk today is whether the various legislative and judicial
reactions to the problems we have had, including Enron and WorldCom, are going
to make a difference. It has been two years since the collapse of Enron. It was in
late 2001 that WorldCom melted down. After that, we had Adelphia, Freddie Mac,
HealthSouth, and others. It has been approximately one year since the SarbanesOxley Act2 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”) became effective. As many of you know, that piece
of legislation was an attempt by Congress to address the deficiencies Congress saw,
largely in the areas of disclosure, governance, and independence.
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In addition to this legislation, numerous rules have been adopted by
regulatory agencies, most notably the SEC,3 to implement Sarbanes-Oxley. The
Department of Labor4 has also done some work in the whistleblower area. In
addition to the regulatory rules, the courts have been active. That is the area where I
am particularly interested. In my opinion, some Delaware decisions are redefining
and changing the law perhaps in ways that are not clearly recognizable, even to those
of us who have practiced in this area in the past.
The views expressed herein are the views of the speaker and do not
necessarily reflect the views of Alston & Bird.
I would like to discuss two things today. First, I want to walk through the
changes that have been brought about by Sarbanes-Oxley. In that regard, many of
you will be as knowledgeable, and perhaps more knowledgeable, than I am on
specific subjects. There has been a rash of legislation, rules, and interpretations that
have come out recently. Second, I would like to step back and talk about whether
this new legislation is going to make a difference. Is any particular pronouncement
going to matter, and on the whole, is it going to matter? This simply reflects my
personal view; others will undoubtedly differ. There are people in this audience that
probably have very strong views that are equally valid.
My perspective comes from spending twenty-five years doing securities
litigation and corporate work. My primary practice is devoted to counseling CEO’s
and boards of directors. I have a number of clients that I advise on the front end on
disclosure issues, corporate governance matters, the relationship between the board
and the CEO, and things like that. The balance of my practice primarily deals with
what happens when the wheels come off the track and there is a crisis, such as when
an audit committee requires a special investigation, when the auditor is refusing to
sign off on the financials, or when the SEC or the Justice Department5 has come in.
Trying to get a company through that type of crisis can be very difficult, as you can
imagine.
My practice group, the securities litigation practice group, has thirty lawyers
in it. We are the largest in the Southeast, and we clearly have the dominant securities
litigation defense practice in the Southeast. Unfortunately, in addition to drawing
3
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upon the lawyers in the securities litigation group, I am drawing more and more on
the lawyers in my white-collar group. One of the big changes from three years ago
has been the aggressive enforcement by the Justice Department. I also have other
corporate lawyers who have very specialized expertise in governance issues that work
with me.
We are currently representing the Examiner in the Enron bankruptcy. We
are also involved in HealthSouth; sometimes it seems like half of the bar is involved
in that matter. We are also involved in Freddie Mac. For those of you that have not
followed that situation, Baker & Botts LLP did a special investigation into the matter
and there is a report that you can pull off of the Freddie Mac web site.6 All of these
cases I have mentioned have had a lot of public attention and a lot of concern about
whether there was any wrongdoing. We are also involved in King Pharmaceutical,7 a
matter that is a little closer to home. We also represent a number of other large
companies whose only sin is that their stock has dropped. In addition to the cases
that I have mentioned, we probably have another 20 cases that we are handling in all
variety of matters.
I think in order to go through the recent legislative and judicial developments
and to reflect on whether they will make a difference, we need to take a second and
look at the environment that we are in today and see how that differs from the past.
When I was talking to Dr. Neel,8 we spoke about how things have changed over the
years. I remember perhaps five years ago, if a company missed its earnings, it
suffered a significant percent stock drop. People thought that was terrible, and it
was. Of course, you hate to lose market capitalization.
Last year I represented a small public company that missed its numbers, no
restatement involved. It had a very heavy institutional ownership. When the
company announced that it was going to miss its numbers, the institutions started
bailing because many institutions have to get out if there is a twenty percent decline.
Baker Botts LLP. Report to the Board of Directors: Internal Investigation of Certain Accounting Matters, Dec.
10, 2002 – July 21, 2003, available at http://www.freddiemac.com/news/board_report/.
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It became self-fulfilling. There was a market imbalance and when the dust settled
two days later, that stock had lost 82 percent of its value.
The statistics from NERA,9 one of the top economic consulting firms,
substantiate what I have told you. According to its analysis, the median investor
losses in 2001 were about $176 million and just under $350 million in 2002. There
are cases like Enron, WorldCom, and others where the losses are in the billions of
dollars. In fact, these large losses are an example of the problems that companies
face. A large company can lose just a few dollars per share, but given the market cap
number of shareholders, could be looking at billions of dollars in losses. The
plaintiffs’ bar has not failed to notice this and has been extremely aggressive lately.
The consequences of missing earnings are so much more dramatic today than they
used to be. In the old days, a number of securities fraud suits were filed and would
go through discovery, and you would settle some and others you would litigate.
Generally, that was the extent of the issues you would encounter in securities fraud
litigation.
Now when a company stumbles, the situation has an eerie resemblance to a
Wild Kingdom show, when you see the wildebeest go down and all of the hyenas
jump on it. Multiple securities class actions suits are filed, and with those suits there
are multiple public press releases telling the world that these suits have been filed.
In addition to securities fraud suits filed in federal court, where there is a
requirement that you either buy or sell securities, we are now seeing what are called
“holders’ suits.” Where the State of California came up with this one, I do not
know. The Fritz Companies case10 is an example of this type of suit, where the plaintiff
does not have to have bought or sold securities. The argument goes something like
this: “I was holding it, and I would have sold it at the top for a lot of money if you
had really told me the truth.” The California courts apparently recognize the
potential for abuse in such situations, and have set forth heightened pleading
requirements.

National Economics Research Associates, or NERA Economic Consulting, is an international firm
of economists who devise practical solutions to highly complex business and legal issues arising from
competition, regulation,
public policy, strategy, finance, and litigation.
9
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So now there is class action litigation in federal court. Some members of the
plaintiffs’ bar are bringing what are called Section 11 claims, claims based upon a
securities offering in state court. There are state court actions by holders, and then
there are derivative suits that get filed either federal or state court, or both. As if that
was not bad enough, if a company happens to have an ERISA plan,11 the company is
going to be sued by the ERISA bar, which will do the same thing. The ERISA suit
will be filed in federal court. And, just when you thought you could not stand the
fun, you are going to get visits from the SEC, potentially the Department of Labor,
and the Justice Department.
The big change has been in the Justice Department. In years past, the SEC
and the Justice Department had to have fairly concrete complaints presented to them
in order to take action. Now, those agencies are in a position where they do not
want to be embarrassed. The SEC does not want to explain why it missed an Enron
and why it did not review that company’s financials for several years. The SEC and
the Justice Department are now in an environment that if they get a complaint, they
feel compelled to look at it.
The Justice Department became more aggressive in January 2003. Then
Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson put out some guidelines to the U.S.
Attorney General’s Office for charging corporations and partnerships with crimes.
These guidelines update a 1999 pronouncement by then Deputy Attorney General
Eric Holder. While these guidelines are carefully written in government speak, those
of us who read them cautiously and know the environment believe that they
significantly open the door to allow U.S. Attorneys to pursue public corporations.
Before these guidelines were put out, I think there was a bias in the Justice
Department against doing so. The Justice Department tended to go against the
individuals who committed the crimes. But now, there is a clear movement to look
hard at whether the corporation should be indicted as well. It is a terrible thing for a
corporation to be indicted, particularly in this environment. In fact, it is not much
better to have your officers indicted.
I can assure you that Wall Street does not wait around to let you sort things
out. If that happens, the consequences are very high. The Justice Department
understands that the shareholders of a public company are innocent shareholders
and that they will be damaged if such an indictment is issued. However, the Justice
Department also believes that there is a huge value in sending a message to the
corporations that improprieties are not going to be tolerated, and that the
11
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corporation and its officers will be made poster children for the Justice Department
if the circumstances warrant it.
In my opinion, one of the most interesting things that has happened in the
last two years is the movement by the SEC and the Justice Department to essentially
deputize the private bar. They have figured out that their ability to unravel
something like Enron, WorldCom, or other matters is tenuous. If these regulators
put the kind of resources on those cases that the private bar can, they are going to
lack resources on other matters.
What the government is doing now is to say to corporations: “if you will
cooperate, if you will do the right thing, and if you convince us that you, the
corporation, do not have a black heart, but that you just have some rogue officers or
employees, we may agree not to indict you or we may go easier on you.” The
government looks at things like: whether the company has a compliance program;
did it bring the matter to the attention of the government; and are they working
aggressively with the government to find the problem? One area that troubles me
most is that the government is asking companies to waive the work product and
attorney-client privilege so that it can see exactly what went on. Unfortunately, that
makes it very difficult for the company and for lawyers involved in the private
litigation. That is an area that is still being resolved, but if a lawyer has to choose
between having a problem with the Justice Department or the private bar, I submit
we all know which one the lawyer will choose.
What else is going on out there? We are seeing more cases being filed. The
PSLRA12 has not slowed down the private bar. One of the things we have seen is
that the members of the plaintiffs’ bar have become very aggressive in using private
investigators to talk to former employees in an effort to build their cases. The bar in
Delaware is also using the books and records provision.13 Most corporations are
required under state law to provide information to shareholders upon request. It is
amazing how few corporations really appreciate the fact that this provision exists.
Frankly, it is amazing how few plaintiffs’ lawyers utilize it as a means of informal
discovery. The Delaware bar has pushed that for quite some time. Now, the
plaintiffs’ bar is becoming much more informed because the stakes are much greater.
It is worth spending a couple hundred thousand dollars to conduct an investigation,
if you are suing a major company.
12
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Settlements are now more costly. As a percentage of the loss, however,
settlements have come down simply because the money is not there in D&O14
insurance to pay for the kinds of losses that are being encountered. I do not have
the statistics in front of me, but the median settlement is probably no more than, and
possibly even less than, five percent of the investor’s losses. But, D&O coverage is
going through the roof, although I heard recently there may be some change in that.
The carriers are much quicker to deny coverage than they ever were in the past.
That is the environment that we are in.
Now, let us talk a little bit about what Congress and the regulators have done
to try to address the current situation. Sarbanes-Oxley has three principal
approaches to dealing with the problem. First, it focuses on enhanced corporate
accountability for companies, executives, and directors, increasing their explicit
oversight functions and creating criminal penalties for failure to do so. One such
failure in oversight is not having the proper certifications. As any CEO or CFO in
the room knows, the corporation must essentially certify the accuracy of its financial
statements. Second, it increases the oversight of companies through enhanced
disclosure requirements, auditor independence, and the creation of a Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board. Third, it has extended the statute of
limitations for securities fraud claims. Before Sarbanes-Oxley, the statute of
limitations was one year from the date of discovery or three years from the violation.
Now, the statute of limitations is two years from the date of discovery and five years
from the violation.
Sarbanes-Oxley has been subject to considerable criticism from people who
believe that the act was not well conceived, and that any legislation that is rushed
through without getting the input of the various constituencies is flawed. It is not
clear that the impediments in Sarbanes-Oxley have been cured by the rules
themselves. There is a lot of concern that these measures are either duplicative or
unnecessary. Beyond that, Congress had previously given the SEC the tools it
needed. There were already provisions in the Securities Exchange Act dealing with
the relationship between a corporation and its auditors. There were provisions
which set forth the obligations of officers or directors with respect to the accuracy of
financials. There were already provisions that allowed the SEC to bring actions
against third parties for aiding and abetting. Finally, Sarbanes-Oxley is also costly
from a compliance standpoint. In terms of cost, I think the real unknown is the cost
to entrepreneurialism. Will all the focus on compliance and all of the concern about
14
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doing the wrong thing chill corporations from pursuing potential business
opportunities?
Judicially, there have been a number of changes lately. It is probably true
here in Tennessee, and it is certainly true in Georgia, that the body of law in the area
of corporate governance is not particularly well developed. As a result, Georgia
courts, like many others, tend to look to Delaware courts for guidance. The
Delaware judges certainly believe that they are, and they may well be, the preeminent
scholars in this area. However, lately some decisions have been coming out of the
Delaware Chancery Court and the Delaware Supreme Court that are of concern to
many people that practice in the corporate area, for the cases are interesting in terms
of where they are taking the law. These cases primarily deal with either director
independence or when a director is exculpated from personal liability.
A minute ago, I went through a list of horrors concerning what happens to a
corporation when it has a problem. Some of you might be wondering why in the
world anybody would want to serve on a board of a public company. One of the
reasons people agree to serve is that generally there are provisions that exculpate the
board members from personal liability as long as they act in good faith and are not
disloyal to the corporation. Liability for a director is generally premised either on
concepts akin to negligence or gross negligence. Delaware is a gross negligence state.
There is some concern that Georgia and Florida, for example, may be simple
negligence.
Suppose a director was negligent in doing a merger and acquisition
transaction, and there was an allegation that the disclosures were incomplete. In that
instance, the courts could step in and enjoin the transaction or order more complete
disclosure. Generally, however, the director is not subject to personal liability in that
situation unless he failed to act in good faith. If the director met the standard of
care, was informed, and did not have a personal interest in the transaction, then the
director should not be held personally liable. If, however, the director did not
perform the requisite amount of work required to become informed and was
negligent, the director would have breached his duty of care, but would not
necessarily be subject to economic sanctions. Now, in light of a couple cases,
including the Disney decision,15 there is a greater likelihood that an inattentive
director will not be only deemed negligent, but also disloyal and to have acted in bad
faith.

15
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In order to appreciate what Congress has done and whether it is going to
make a difference, I have to step back and look into why we have the problem in the
first place. If you do not know or have an opinion as to what causes the problem, it
is hard to determine whether all of these changes really make a difference. From my
personal perspective I think the problems stem from two things: greed and fear.
GREED
In the 1990’s, unimaginable wealth was created by people who did not spend
twenty or thirty years building businesses. Instead, this wealth was created overnight
by people who had the next new idea, and by people who had options.
Furthermore, the amount of money that people believed they were making was just
staggering. You have all read about this. You have seen the person who made
twenty or fifty million dollars, and you step back and wonder what they did that was
so significant? Part of it was the times, but the problem was that companies, at that
point in time, were largely compensating their employees with stock options. I
remember when the mantra was: “…we have got to align the interest of the
shareholders and management.” That mantra did not work very well. I am not
saying there is not a role for stock options, but in hindsight, I think a lot of stock
options were given out with flawed criteria for vesting; that is, when you earned
them. For example, options based upon a company hitting a share price are an
invitation to disaster.
At the same time, money was flowing into the market because of mutual
funds, the entrance of the retail investor, and fear that people were going to miss the
next new thing. As a result, valuations of companies went through the roof.
Multiples got to extraordinarily high levels. Unlike restrictive stock, stock options
give an individual the option to purchase the stock at a certain stock price. For
example, if the company stock is trading at twenty dollars when the employee is
hired, the employee might get an option to purchase the company’s stock at that
price at a later date. As a result, the employee is able to realize the appreciation once
the stock goes above twenty dollars.
Imagine a scenario where the company has just granted employees options.
The company is in a go-go market and the stock goes through the roof. The CFO
can see that the company is going to miss its numbers, and realizes that he and all of
the employees will lose the value of their options. He also knows that shareholders
are going to be devastated.
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Fear
Unfortunately, the fear of disappointing the market, disappointing
employees, and wiping out value creates an incentive for companies to finesse
financial issues. I am afraid that there were some people who succumbed to that
pressure.
To add to that, the mindset was different in the late 1990’s and early 2000; it
was a land rush. The quality of earnings suffered, but I think people knew it in many
companies, particularly the new age companies. The idea was to get as much
revenue as possible. Many new age companies decided to try to make as big of a
footprint as possible. They knew that there was going to be shake-outs, so they
thought, we will survive this; we will sort it out and get it cleaned up later. There was
certainly a real problem with the quality of earnings.
At that time companies also became responsible for hitting the numbers set
by First Call. These were numbers that often the company had embraced or were
pushed to in order to sustain a certain level. That was not bad enough. The
company could still get hurt if it reached its reported target, but missed the whisper.
The whisper might be something like, “the consensus is ten cents a share, but I think
they are going to do twelve.” If the company hit ten, its stock was devastated
because even though it hit the consensus number, it missed the whisper.
Analysis
In my opinion, because Sarbanes-Oxley does not fundamentally address
greed or fear, the result of that legislation will be of limited value. I think the best
thing that we are going to get out of Sarbanes-Oxley is a renewed focus, bringing all
of this into the minds of people in public companies; reminding companies that the
integrity of its numbers, and integrity of management, is important. Among other
things, I think there will be some limited psychological value that will be positive; it
will probably deter some people from pushing the envelope. Unfortunately though,
after doing this for twenty-five years, I do not believe it is going to deter the crooks,
those people that really intend to do bad things. There have always been penalties
for people like that under the securities laws and under the federal criminal laws.
These penalties have not worked before, and I do not believe this new legislation is
going to make much of a difference now. Frankly, I think the only thing that will
make a difference is that the John Public of the employees is savvier now and is
more willing to turn in people that he knows are engaged in wrongdoing. But I do
not think this legislation will get to the fundamental issues.
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Advisories
At this time, I want to give you some advisories that Alston & Bird put
together on the various Sarbanes-Oxley initiatives. After that I want to bring to your
attention some cases that I find to be of interest. Hopefully, all of this will give you
an overview of what Sarbanes-Oxley attempted to do, and what the folks who
implement the rules have done.
The first rule is that Sarbanes-Oxley requires disgorgement of bonuses and
profits in the event of a financial reporting restatement. The essence of this rule is
that if you restate as a result of some sort of a problem, the CEO or CFO can be
required to disgorge their bonuses, and many of those are substantial. However, it
only applies when the company is “required to restate.” Therefore, it only applies
when there is some level of misconduct. It is understood that the CEO or CFO
does not have to be aware of what preceded him. Right now it is also unclear what
profits must be disgorged. It is easy to determine if the CEO got a cash bonus that
year. It becomes harder if the bonus is part of a multi-year analysis that allows the
CEO to vest options or receive other types of compensation. Obviously, no CEO
or CFO wants to lose a bonus. I think that the intensity and focus is causing honest
CEOs and CFOs to ask their subordinates, “are you sure that you got this right?”
People are looking into things more diligently. However, I do not think anyone
seriously believes that a CEO or CFO standing at the crossroads between
committing a financial fraud that will probably be worth millions of dollars to him,
and running the risk of getting caught, thus giving up his bonus, will be deterred by
that consequence.
The second thing I want to talk about is that the SEC adopted rules requiring
MD&A16 disclosure of off-balance sheet arrangements and aggregate contractual
obligations. I actually think this is a good one. The MD&A disclosure is the portion
of a securities filing in which management is supposed to step back. I like Warren
Buffett’s17 description of MD&A. He said, “It is like telling a partner who has been
gone for a year what is going on in the business.” It is when management is
supposed to step back, and in a narrative fashion say here are all these numbers, but
let me tell you what they mean. Things like whether your financing sources are going
to be reoccurring, or whether your revenues are reoccurring, are a critical portion of
16
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the MD&A. One of the concerns is that there have been a lot of these special
purpose entity off-balance sheet vehicles that, because of sophisticated swaps, put
arrangements, or derivatives, still cause the public company to retain liability. That
liability is then difficult for the reader of financial statements to fully appreciate.
Having said that, there is some debate as to whether the SEC rule goes far
enough. The big debate was over whether a company had to disclose any
arrangement of this nature that may affect its financials. Required disclosure is now
reasonably likely. A company that does not necessarily want to show an off-balance
sheet vehicle will potentially conclude that it is not reasonably likely the off-balance
sheet vehicle will have a financial impact. There are still loop holes, but I think it is a
good step in the right direction.
Lawyers have not been immune from this scrutiny. Right now there is a big
debate between the state bar associations, the American Bar Association, the SEC,
and Congress over some of these issues. Essentially, I think it was Congress’ desire
to turn lawyers into whistleblowers. If lawyers did not get satisfaction within a
corporation, Congress wanted them to become whistleblowers, to go to the SEC or
other regulators and tell on their clients. I am pretty fortunate, because I have always
been able to get access to the audit committees and boards of directors. However,
when you talk to lawyers in New York, for example, they are dealing with very large
multi-national corporations and they have never gotten anywhere near the board.
In my case however, if I have a problem, I go before the board right away.
But, if you are one of the hundreds of lawyers that GE18 or Exxon19 uses, your ability
to get access to the board may be perhaps a little different. I am not sure that this is
a major change at the end of the day. Lawyers have to be guided, not just by the
ethics of the bar, but by their own personal ethics. Most lawyers that I know would
take it up the ladder on their own or would withdraw if they came across a truly
fraudulent situation. I think initiatives like the Justice Department and SEC initiative
to get a lawyer to waive attorney-client privilege as part of cooperation, or initiatives
designed to have you report to agencies, are things the bar needs to be concerned
about and continue to examine. These types of initiatives run the risk of
undermining the attorney-client privilege to the point where, the first advice that a
lawyer will need to give to a client is, “You cannot trust me to keep your secrets
confidential.” That is a really tough way to start a relationship.
18
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Another set of rules primarily deal with auditor independence, audit
committees, and rules on improper influence of audits. I think these rules are a good
idea. Many of the boards that I have dealt with had at least a majority of exclusively
independent directors on audit committees. It probably was not bad for the boards
of some companies to get a little nudge to make sure they got to that point. Stock
exchanges also have various rules on independence. Those listing requirements have
helped as well.
The SEC adopted final rules regarding improper influence on audits, and it is
a little broader than the previous Rule 13b-2 of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, as amended.20 There were already rules that precluded a company from
misleading its auditor or doing other things that were deemed inappropriate. I think
this rule makes the requirement a little clearer, that the scope is broader than just
trying to influence an auditor in connection with a registration statement or with
respect to a periodic report. The more interesting aspect of the rule is that it signals
that the SEC may go after third parties. Supposedly, there is no private right of
action. One of the things that has bothered the SEC for quite a while is embodied in
the following scenario: Company A is entering into transactions after the end of the
year. It cannot get the transactions closed by year’s end. Company B, which is
buying from Company A, knows that Company A has to get these sales by year’s
end. A lot of companies are that way, particularly in the software industry. So
Company B will take Company A to the wire. They may do a deal on January 2nd or
3rd. However, they will agree that that deal was done as of December 31st, so that
Company A can book the deal as revenue in that year and not in the next year. I
think to some extent, and this is a gross overstatement, Company B’s attitude is that
it is not its problem. Company B got a good deal and took advantage of a problem;
it is up to Company A to report the transaction correctly. The SEC is not amused. I
think companies are going to see the SEC bringing actions under this rule when
those companies provide false information as part of the audit verification process,
or when companies create documents that they know are false. I also think
companies are going to see the SEC using more of the aiding and abetting
capabilities that are already available under the anti-fraud provisions.
Another interesting requirement is the SEC’s requirement on posting Section
16 reports.21 Essentially, the SEC has shortened the time available for insiders to
report on their trades. The rule used to be that insiders had a certain period of time
20
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to report. Now it is essentially real time reporting. The concern was that insiders
were bailing out ahead of bad news. I know there have been a few cases where this
has happened, but I am not sure this requirement is going to make a whole lot of
difference.
There are also the internal controls requirements. The SEC, as I mentioned
earlier, is requiring public companies to have their CEO and CFO essentially attest
to the accuracy of the company’s financial statements and internal controls. The real
big upcoming requirement is 404,22 which is an internal control certification. It
requires a deep analysis of the company’s internal controls and documentation.
Major corporations are spending in the hundreds of thousands of dollars trying to do
the analysis and be prepared for it.
Whistleblower
The next to last thing that I want to cover under the topic of legislation is the
recent pronouncement on whistleblower rules.23 These are fairly specific. I think a
lot of people were nervous early on that companies would get in trouble if they fired
someone, and then that person would claim they were fired because they were aware
of wrongdoing within the corporation. Now it is pretty clear that a company will not
get in trouble for firing someone, unless it is doing so in retaliation for them going to
one of the regulators. The other day I saw that there were about 140 whistleblower
reports to the Department of Labor, but it was not clear how many of those were
actually valid reports. In my opinion, this is going to have less benefit than people
think because individuals rarely go to a regulator. However, I think that the focus on
whistleblowers and the attention that certain whistleblowers have received lately has
made it more comfortable for whistleblowers and disgruntled employees to come
forward.
Director and Shareholder Voice
The last thing I want to advise you of in this area is the emergence of new
rules regarding the director nomination process and shareholder communications
with directors. The basic idea here is to give the shareholders more of a voice. The
big debate right now is what is going to come out of these rules and whether they go
far enough. As I understand it, some activists want shareholders to have the right to
nominate candidates or to have a greater role in the nomination of director
22

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 at 404 (2000).

23

18 U.S.C. 1514A.
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candidates. Under the new rules, if a company is going to allow shareholders to
participate, the company has to do more to let them know how to participate. One
of the more interesting rules is that corporations have to say whether they have a
mechanism for getting shareholder communications, and whether directors are going
to be accessible to shareholders.
A company can say no to increased shareholder participation, but then the
board will have a stigma that it does not listen to its shareholders. On the other
hand, in this environment where people are saying that directors do not spend
enough time on the core business, I am not sure if I want my directors leafing
through six inches of e-mails from every shareholder who thinks they have a better
idea on how to run the company. I think what you are going to find are procedures
much like the ones in the compliance area, where the reports go to a lawyer to get
carefully screened. At the end of the day, I am just not sure that these are going to
have much value.
Case Law
Finally, I want to talk for just a minute about some of the cases that have
come out because I think they are as interesting as anything else going on right now.
The one that intrigues me the most is the new Disney decision.24 Real quickly, for
those of you who do not remember the facts: Michael Eisner,25 the CEO of Disney,
was facing a crisis. He had lost Jeffrey Katzenberg26 and some of the other key
lieutenants who had gone on to form Dream Works. Eisner had a problem; he was
not viewed as the easiest guy to work for. So, he hired his good friend Michael
Ovitz,27 who had been the head of the talent agency, arguably without the full
support or involvement of the board. Without going into the facts in great detail,
Ovitz was a failure. So, Ovitz and Eisner purportedly worked out a not-for-cause
termination that the plaintiffs allege puts $140 million in Ovitz’s pocket.28 The

24

In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).

25

Michael Eisner, Chairman and CEO of Disney.

26

Jeffrey Katzenberg, Former Disney Executive.

27

Michael Ovitz, founder and head of CAA, Creative Artist Agency. Former Disney President.

28

In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 351 (Del. Ch. 1998).
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plaintiffs’ bar then brought a suit against the directors alleging that they had breached
their fiduciary duty in the hiring and termination of Ovitz.29
At that time, the Delaware Chancery Court concluded that this was a
decision protected by the Business Judgment Rule based on the record before it,
which included the allegation that there was a compensation expert.30 The Business
Judgment Rule is a rule that the courts have adopted which basically says it is not
appropriate for courts to try to second guess business decisions of boards of
directors. So what the court is going to look at is whether the process worked, and
whether the decision was made, as I said earlier, by directors who are independent,
do not have a financial stake in the deal, and who are informed. If the court finds
that the directors meet all of these requirements, essentially, that is it, and the case is
dismissed. The first Disney case was thrown out. The Court found that the decision
to hire Ovitz and the termination were protected by the Business Judgment Rule.31
Then Chancellor Chandler32 gives a speech and he says, “You know, that old
Disney case, that was a terrible pleading that we looked at, you know, but there
might be something there.” And guess what? The new complaint came in, and it
focused on the issue of good faith.33 This is something that people who practice in
this area are watching very acutely. There is a Vice Chancellor by the name of Leo
Strine34 who has written an article, in which he suggests that if a director fails to be
informed and to be active in the corporation, at some point that behavior becomes
more than a failure of due care; it becomes a breach of the duty of loyalty.
Again, why does all this matter? Because, as I said up front, if a director
violates the duty of care, and the corporation has an exculpation provision, the
director is not personally liable. But if the director is not entitled to exculpation, and
has acted in bad faith, the director can be held personally liable. In the second
Disney decision, the Court found on the pleadings, not on the facts, that it is not
good faith to allow two old friends to cut a deal like this without a compensation
29

Id.

30

Id. at 365.

31

In Re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342.

32

The Honorable William B. Chandler III, Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery.

33

In Re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275.

34

The Honorable Leo E. Strine, Jr., Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery.
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expert.35 If the case winds up that way, the directors will be personally liable subject
to any insurance they might have that will pay for that $140 million plus severance.
In an interesting twist, possibly because the court felt sorry for the directors,
the court also says, Ovitz, hang on here, you cannot just walk off with your $140
million.36 While normally people can bargain at arm’s length with the corporation, if
a person is an officer, that person has a fiduciary duty to ensure that the process is
fair. Negotiating with an old friend is not fair process.37 I am sure Ovitz was
shocked by that decision, as many people are, but he is in the case as well.
Depending upon how it plays out, Ovitz might have to pay that money back. I think
that the court’s willingness to find at the pleading stage that there was not good faith
is a problem, because it blurs the line between due care and good faith. In my
opinion, this development is going to make it a lot easier for the plaintiffs’ bar to get
past a motion to dismiss. The prior cases, McCall38 and Abbott,39 were cases where
the board had ignored repeated red flags, including FDA violations or other criminal
conduct. So I think that this decision is critical.
I will now discuss other cases that have come out, and then I will take
questions. Oracle,40 a decision by Vice-chancellor Strine, is one in which the Oracle
directors were sued. In the derivative context, a corporation can form a special
committee of independent directors who decide whether the corporation should
bring the suit itself or whether the suit should be dismissed. Oracle got two new
directors out of Stanford University. The problem was that many of the people on
the board, including Larry Ellison,41 had deep ties to Stanford. The board, including
Mr. Ellison, apparently pledged millions to the school. Vice-chancellor Strine said
that those directors were not independent. Therefore, the millions that had been
spent and all the work that had been done on the investigation would not be
sufficient to throw out the lawsuit. Vice-chancellor Strine stated that even though
35

In Re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 287-88.

36

Id. at 290.

37

Id. at 291.

38

McCall v. Scott, 250 F.3d 997.

39

In Re Abbot Labs. S’holders Litig., 352 F.2d 795, 809 (7th Cir. 2001).

40

In Re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).

41

Larry Ellison, Oracle’s Chairman, C.E.O., and largest stockholder.
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the new directors had no economic interest in the decision, the court could not
ignore the social ties and relations that existed.42
The Fuqua decision43 is not dissimilar. Where the judge found too much
Cardinal red in Oracle; the judge found a little too much Duke University blue in
Fuqua. Frankly, many people who practiced in this area would have avoided this type
of situation.
The Guttman decision44 is an interesting discussion of when demand is
required or not required in a derivative suit. It also raises the question of whether a
director is entitled to exculpation if the director has received an improper personal
benefit. This case suggests that if a director is collecting a salary and stock options,
and is asleep on the job, the director is receiving an improper personal benefit. That
is where the commentary is going. Whether that means the director has to forfeit
compensation to avoid being found liable for the transaction is yet to be determined.
The last one is an action that has been brought by the SEC against
Chancellor Corporation.45 This is a suit that, to me, fulfills the threat or promise that
Stephen Cutler46 has been giving for three years at “SEC Speaks” to start finding an
audit committee that they are going to go after for an internal controls breakdown.
In sum, there has been a lot of recent activity in this area. I am not sure all
of it is good or productive. It is going to take us a little bit longer to know for sure.
Unfortunately, in the end, I tend to believe that the public perception and the change
in the attitude of the public will do more than any of these specific rules. Thank you.

42

In Re Oracle, 824 A.2d at 947-48.

43

Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 971 (Del. Ch. 1985).

44

Guttman v. Jen-Hsun Huang, 823 A. 2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003).

45

SEC v. Chancellor Group, Inc., 1998 SEC LEXIS 2729 (D.D.C. 1998).

46

Stephen Cutler, Director of Enforcement, United States Securities and Exchange Commission
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Question and Answer
JOSEPH V. CARCELLO:47 One of the things you said is that you do not
think that Sarbanes-Oxley, and the judicial rules that resulted, are going to be very
effective because they will not change the basic nature of man, namely, greed and
fear. Although some of Sarbanes-Oxley certainly tries to get at those things by not
recouping the bonus as well as others things, I would agree with you. I am curious
as to your reaction to a major aspect of Sarbanes-Oxley and the change in the listing
standards which significantly ratchets up the responsibilities of auditing
professionals, both external and internal; it changes their locus of control from the
CEO and CFO to an independent audit committee. If this process works the way it
is intended, those parties should now have the ability to do much more extensive
work with much less risk of being terminated by a CEO or CFO who does not want
what they are doing discovered. So, the actual behavior may not change, but the
detection of the behavior may change, and the base rate of misleading financial
statements may go down.
JOHN L. LATHAM: I think you are right, that is a big change. It was not a
great situation when the CEO or CFO hired the auditor. It was common knowledge
that the audit was a loss leader. Everybody tried to get the audit fees down as low as
they could. In turn, the auditors tried to make it up by selling tax or consulting
services. So they were very dependent upon the discretion of the CEO or CFO. On
the other hand, at the end of the day, it is really going to depend on the forcefulness
of the audit committee.
I have seen two very different examples. In the first, the audit committee
was responsible to auditors in name only. In another, I have a client that had some
historical issues. The company got a new audit committee chairman who fired the
auditors and hired a new auditor. The new chairman was very aggressive in having
executive meetings with the auditors without the CFO present. Those auditors
clearly understood that they reported to the audit committee. Although I am not
suggesting that every company should fire its auditor, the message must be sent to
the auditor in unmistakable terms. I think that is going to help.
JOSEPH V. CARCELLO: Let me follow up. In regards to the example you
gave in which the audit committee was in charge of the relationship in name only,
47 Joseph V. Carcello, co-founder and Director of Research for the University of Tennessee’s
Corporate Governance Center, and William B. Stokely Distinguished Scholar in the Department of
Accounting and Business Law at the University of Tennessee.
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there are some very strong statutes that lay out specifically the responsibilities of the
audit committee and what they are supposed to do. In cases where the committee
does not carry out those responsibilities and there is a massive breakdown, do you
think the private bar would have any success in that case arguing breach of the duty
of loyalty?
JOHN L. LATHAM: I think that is where they are going to go, because they
know that they cannot get there through duty of care. I think that most of those
suits will allege sustained failure of oversight through sustained failure to ensure that
there were adequate internal controls. It is dicey to be a board member these days
and particularly to be on an audit committee. Former SEC Commissioner Richard
C. Breeden, who became involved with WorldCom three years ago, made the
statement to the commissioners and the enforcement staff that he thought that too
much was being asked of audit committees. In his experience, he found it difficult
to get qualified people to serve on boards. I think that problem is worse. With all
due respect, if I were a CEO of a public company, I do not know if I would want to
be on another corporation’s board. Frankly, in that situation, I am not sure that the
board of directors should let me be on another corporation’s board. So, I think that
there will be some negative aspects as well. Some people have suggested a retired
CFO’s relief act. I think those are the kind of folks that will serve on audit
committees.
JOAN M. HEMINWAY:48 A number of scholars have suggested that it
might be useful for us to put more effort into looking at behavioral science and the
way that boards and management makes decisions. What do you think about that
suggestion?
JOHN L. LATHAM: That is an interesting question. I would say yes, but I
am not sure what you do with the output of such a study. I know that given the
same rules and the same number of people, the personal dynamic coupled with the
nature of the people and their interaction with the CEO will give you totally different
risk tolerances and attitudes. So, I think it is something that is worth exploring, and I
would be interested in seeing the results. I have experienced it, but I have never seen
it on a more studied basis. I think it is important.

Joan MacLeod Heminway, Associate Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College of
Law.
48
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GEORGE W. KUNEY:49 Do you see increased federal regulation
continuing? By that I mean new regulations rather than strict enforcement of laws
that are already on the books. Or do you see the states taking back governance of
the accounting industry and governance of corporate decision making, which has
historically been their role?
JOHN L. LATHAM: There are many people who believe that these
decisions out of the Delaware Chancery Court are a reflection of the court’s desire to
protect its turf and show that it can handle problems by saying that the existing tools
are adequate in order to avoid a federalization of the corporate governance area. I
also think that the state securities regulators are becoming much more aggressive.
Certainly, you can say whatever you want about the appropriate balance between the
state regulators and the SEC, but I think a lot of people are troubled that Eliot
Spitzer50 is the one that keeps turning up the dirt and not the SEC. So I do not
know. I think the SEC would like to be in control here. But it is pretty hard in this
environment for Congress and the SEC to take action that would supplant the state
regulators.
GEORGE W. KUNEY: That is all the questions we have time for today.
On behalf of both The Clayton Center for Corporate Governance and The Clayton
Center for Entrepreneurial Law, I want to thank you very much for coming and
speaking with us today.
JOHN L. LATHAM: Thank you all.

49

50

George W. Kuney, Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Clayton Center for
Entrepreneurial Law, The University of Tennessee College of Law.
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer for the State of New York.
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Introduction
Although the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware2 (the
“Delaware Statute”) and the Tennessee Business Corporation Act3 (the “Tennessee
Statute”) are substantially similar, key differences exist that a practitioner should
consider when advising a client regarding the choice of jurisdiction for incorporation.
The statute governing the place of incorporation may provide material advantages
and disadvantages for the corporation. Part I of this article summarizes several key
jurisdictional distinctions between Delaware and Tennessee corporate law. Part II
presents a comprehensive, side-by-side comparison of the business corporation
statutes for Delaware and Tennessee. The comparison chart highlights similar
provisions and reveals provisions unique to each jurisdiction.
I. Summary of Jurisdictional Differences
Notice Requirements.
The Tennessee Statute provides that any notice
required by the statute must be in writing, except where oral notice is reasonable.4
Additionally, the Tennessee Statute allows the corporation to specify in its charter
and bylaws the notice requirements consistent with the statute.5 In contrast, the
Delaware Statute explicitly allows a corporation to provide notice to stockholders by
facsimile or e-mail.6 The Delaware Statute also specifies different requirements for
other types of notice.
Filing Requirements. Under the Tennessee Statute, the filing fees are
charged as a flat rate, ranging, for example, from $20 for a charter amendment to
$100 for an initial charter.7 Under the Delaware Statute, while the charges for filing
some documents are flat fees, many documents are taxed at variable rates.8 For
2

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101-398 (2002).

3

TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-11-101- 48-27-103 (2002).

4

TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-11-202(a).

5

TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-11-202(g).

6

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 232(a)-(b).

7

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-11-303(a).

8

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 391.
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example, the fee for filing an original certificate of incorporation is calculated on the
basis of $.02 for each of the first 20,000 authorized shares of par value capital stock,
$.01 for 20,000 to 200,000 shares, and $.004 for each share in excess of 200,000.9
The Tennessee Statute specifies eight types of documents that must be filed
with both the secretary of state and the registrar of deeds in the county of the
corporation’s principal office.10 The Delaware Statute does not require that
documents be filed with the registrar of deeds.
Power to Adopt, Amend, or Repeal Bylaws. Under the Tennessee Statute,
the initial bylaws may be adopted by the incorporators or by the board of directors.11
After the initial adoption of the bylaws, the shareholders may amend or repeal the
bylaws, if the charter grants them the power to do so.12 The board of directors may
also have the power to amend or repeal the bylaws, if the charter does not reserve
the power exclusively to the shareholders or specifically exclude the board of
directors from amending a certain provision.13 Under the Delaware Statute, the
initial bylaws may be adopted, amended, or repealed by the incorporators, the initial
directors, or, if the corporation has not yet received payment for stock, the board of
directors.14 After the corporation receives payment for its stock, the stockholders
posses the power to adopt, amend, or repeal the bylaws, and the corporation may
reserve the same power to the board of directors in the certificate of incorporation.15
Service of Process. In Tennessee, the corporation’s agent for service of
process is the registered agent.16 In Delaware, the corporation’s agent for service of
9

Id.

10

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-11-303(a), (d).

11

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-20-201.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a).

15

Id.

16

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-15-104(a).
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process is not only the registered agent but also any officer or director of the
corporation.17
Authorization of Shares. The Tennessee Statute states that a corporation
must authorize at least one class of shares with unlimited voting rights, and entitle at
least one class of shares to the net assets if the corporation dissolves.18 The
Delaware Statute states that a corporation may, but is not required to, issue stock.19
A non-stock corporation, as specified in the certificate of incorporation, may have
members rather than stockholders.20
Distributions. The Tennessee Statute prevents a corporation from making
distributions to shareholders if the corporation would be insolvent under either an
equity test or a balance sheet test.21 The Delaware Statute prevents a corporation
from paying dividends if its capital is less than the capital represented by the issued
and outstanding stock;22 however, the board of directors has discretion to determine
the value of capital as greater than the consideration received for issued stock.23
Special Meeting of Shareholders. The Tennessee Statute provides that a
special meeting of shareholders may be called by either the board of directors or by
the shareholders upon demand of at least ten percent of the shareholders eligible to
vote.24 The Delaware Statute provides that a special meeting of shareholders may be
called by the board of directors or as authorized by the certificate of incorporation.25

17

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 321(a).

18

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-16-101(b).

19

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a).

20

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1).

21

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-16-401(c).

22

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a).

23

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154.

24

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-17-102(a).

25

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d).
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Voting. Under the Delaware Statute, a director who willfully or negligently
refuses to provide a list of stockholders entitled to vote at a meeting is ineligible for
election to office at that meeting.26 The Tennessee Statute does not have a
corresponding provision.
Under the Tennessee Statute, an appointment of proxy is valid for only
eleven months and is revocable, unless otherwise specified.27 Under the Delaware
Statute, a proxy is valid for three years and is irrevocable if, unless stated otherwise in
the proxy, coupled with an interest adequate to support the power transferred.28
Under the Tennessee Statute, a voting trust is valid for only ten years unless
renewed for another ten years.29 The Delaware Statute does not have a
corresponding provision.
Board of Directors. Under the Delaware Statute, a corporation must be
managed by a board of directors unless otherwise specified in the certificate of
incorporation.30 Under the Tennessee Statute, a board of directors must manage the
corporation unless the corporation has fifty or fewer shareholders and the charter
specifies who will perform the duties of the board.31
Elimination or Limitation of a Director’s Liability. Both the Tennessee
Statute and the Delaware Statute provide that director liability may not be eliminated
or limited for: (1) any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its
shareholders; (2) acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law; or (3) unlawful distributions.32 The
Delaware Statute includes a fourth exception prohibiting elimination or limitation of
26

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219(b).

27

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-17-203(c), (d).

28

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(b), (e).

29

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-17-302.

30

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).

31

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-101(a), (c).

32

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-102(b)(3)(A)-(C).
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liability for any transaction from which the director derived an improper personal
benefit.33
Officers. The Tennessee Statute requires a corporation to appoint both a
president and a secretary.34 The Delaware Statute only requires that a corporation
have an officer with the duty to record and keep the minutes of meetings.35
Indemnification. Both the Tennessee Statute and the Delaware Statute allow
for discretionary and mandatory indemnification.36 In both jurisdictions a
corporation may indemnify an individual who acted in good faith, reasonably
believed that the conduct was in the best interest of the corporation, and, in the case
of a criminal proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe the conduct was illegal.37
Under the Tennessee Statute, discretionary indemnification is limited to former
directors of the corporation.38 Under the Delaware Statute, the corporation may
indemnify any director, officer, employee, corporation’s agent, or a person serving at
the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee, or entity agent.39
Share Exchanges. The Tennessee Statute expressly provides for a share
exchange,40 while the Delaware Statutes does not.
Dissenters’ Rights. Under the Tennessee Statute, if a shareholder dissents
from a corporate action and properly demands payment of the value of her shares,
the corporation must determine the value of the shares and pay the dissenter that
value in exchange for the shares.41 If the shareholder is dissatisfied with the
33

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).

34

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-401(a).

35

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a).

36

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §145; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-18-502, 503.

37

Id.

38

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-502(a).

39

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §145(a).

40

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-21-103(a).

41

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-23-206(a).
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valuation, the corporation must petition the court to determine fair value.42 Under
the Delaware Statute, a demand for an appraisal is automatically a matter for the
Court of Chancery; either the corporation or the stockholder may file the petition.43
Dissolution. Under the Tennessee Statute, after dissolution, a corporation
continues to exist until the corporation files articles of termination of corporate
existence and after all assets are distributed to creditors and shareholders.44 Under
the Delaware Statute, corporate existence continues for three years after dissolution
unless the Court of Chancery sets a longer period.45
Records and Reports. The Tennessee Statute requires every corporation to
maintain at its principal office minutes of shareholder and board meetings,
accounting records, records of shareholders, and a copy of the charter, bylaws, and
board resolutions.46 Additionally, corporations must prepare, and, if requested,
furnish annual financial statements to shareholders.47 The Delaware Statute only
requires corporations to keep records maintained in the regular course of business.48
The Tennessee Statute provides that if a shareholder gives the corporation
five days notice, the shareholder is entitled to copy the records that the corporation
is required to maintain; this right may not be revoked in the charter or bylaws.49 The
Delaware Statute provides that if a stockholder gives written demand under oath, the
stockholder has the right to copy records of the corporation during normal business
hours.50
42

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-23-301(a).

43

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a).

44

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-24-108(a).

45

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278.

46

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-26-101(a), (e).

47

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-26-201(a).

48

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 224.

49

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-26-102(a).

50

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b).
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II. Side-by-Side Comparison Chart51
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
TENNESSEE BUSINESS
OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
CORPORATION ACT
A. General Provisions
48-11-101 to 48-11-40252
§232. Notice by electronic transmission.
§202. Notice.
Any notice to stockholders given by the
Notice requirements may be specified in
corporation shall be effective if given by
the charter and bylaws if consistent with
a form of electronic transmission
the notice provisions of the Act. The
consented to by the stockholder
Act specifies that notice shall be in
receiving the notice. Notice
writing except when oral notice is
requirements are listed in the statute
reasonable. Written notice is effective
where other notice types are required by
on the earliest of (1) the date of receipt,
the statute.
(2) five days after deposited in U.S. mail
by first class mail, (3) as indicated by
returned receipt, or (4) twenty days after
deposited in U.S. mail by other than first
class, registered, or certified mail.
§103. Execution, acknowledgment, filing,
§301. Filing Requirements.
recording and effective date of original certificate
Documents to be filed must: (1) be
of incorporation and other instruments;
typewritten or printed on one side of
exceptions.
paper; (2) be executed by the chair of
Instruments to be filed shall be signed, the board of directors (“board”), the
in order of priority, by any authorized
president, or an authorized officer; and
officer of the corporation, a majority
(3) indicate that the document is filed
of the board of directors (“board”), a
pursuant to the Act. Execution requires
majority of the stockholders, or all the a signature and a statement indicating
stockholders. Any signature may be a
the signor’s capacity. The secretary of
facsimile, a conformed signature, or
state may establish procedures for filing,
an electronically transmitted signature. including filing by facsimile.
This chart reflects provisions of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101-398 (2002), and the Tennessee Business Corporation Act, TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 48-11-101 – 48-27-103 (2002) [hereinafter the “Act”]. The chart lists the Act’s provisions in
numerical order on the right side, with the corresponding, non-numerical General Corporation Law
of the State of Delaware provisions on the left side.
51

52 Subsequent citations to specific sections of the Act within specified span cites are presented in the
format: § 48-__-___.

2003]

DELAWARE AND TENNESSEE CORPORATE COMPARISON

GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
§103(b). Instruments may be
acknowledged by either formal
acknowledgement or by signature.
§391. Taxes and fees payable to Secretary of
State upon filing certificate or other paper.
Taxes and fees for filing are listed in
the statute.
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§303. Filing, service, and copying fees.
Fees for filing are listed in the statute.
The following documents must also be
filed in the office of the register of
deeds in the county of the corporation’s
principal office: (1) charter, (2) charter
amendment, (3) restatement of charter,
(4) amended and restated charter, (5)
articles of merger or share exchange, (6)
articles of dissolution and termination
by incorporators or directors, (7) articles
of dissolution, (8) articles of revocation
of dissolution.
§103(d). Execution, acknowledgment, filing,
§304. Effective time and date of document.
recording and effective date of original certificate
Documents accepted for filing are
of incorporation and other instruments;
effective at the time of filing unless a
exceptions.
delayed effective date, no later than
A filed instrument shall be effective
ninety days after the date of filing, is
upon its filing date unless an effective
specified. A charter or application for a
date in the future, not later than ninety certificate of authority must specify the
days after the date of filing, is
registered agent and registered office of
specified.
the corporation.
§103(f). Execution, acknowledgment, filing,
§305. Correcting filed document.
recording and effective date of original certificate
A filed document that is defectively
of incorporation and other instruments;
executed or that contains an incorrect
exceptions.
statement may be corrected by filing
A filed instrument that is defectively
articles of correction.
executed or that reflects an inaccurate
record of a corporate action may be
corrected by filing a certificate of
correction or by filing a corrected
instrument.
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B. Incorporation
48-12-101 to 48-12-107
§101. Incorporators; how corporation formed;
§101. Incorporators.
purposes.
One or more individuals or entities may
Any person, partnership, association, or
act as the incorporator or incorporators
corporation may incorporate a
of a corporation by delivering a charter
corporation by filing a certificate of
to the secretary of state.
incorporation with secretary of state.
§102. Contents of certificate of incorporation.
§102. Charter.
The statute lists elements that the
The statute lists elements that the
certificate of incorporation shall set
charter must set forth, as well as
forth, as well as elements that the
elements that the charter may set forth.
certificate may set forth.
§106. Commencement of corporate existence.
§103. Incorporation.
The incorporator(s) who signed the
Corporate existence begins when the
certificate of incorporation shall
secretary of state files the charter.
constitute the body corporate when
certificate is successfully filed with the
Secretary of State.
Promoters of a corporation are
§104. Liability for preincorporation
fiduciaries of the corporation itself,
transactions.
owing a duty of good faith in dealing
Persons acting on behalf of a
to the corporation. A contract formed corporation are jointly and severally
by a promoter prior to corporate
liable for all liabilities created with
existence does not bind the
knowledge that there was no
corporation.53
incorporation, except for any liability to
a person who reasonably should have
known that there was no incorporation.
§107. Powers of incorporators.
§105. Organization of corporation.
If the initial directors are not named in
After incorporation, the incorporators
the certificate of incorporation, the
or initial directors shall hold a meeting
incorporator(s) shall manage the affairs
to elect directors. The initial or elected
of the corporation, as necessary to
directors shall meet to elect officers,
organize the corporation, until the
complete the organization of the
53 Gladstone v. Bennett, 153 A.2d 577 (Del. Ch. 1959); Stringer v. Elecs. Supply Corp., 2 A.2d 78
(Del. Ch. 1938).
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directors are elected.
§108. Organization meeting of incorporators or
directors named in certificate of incorporation.
After incorporation, the incorporators
or the initial board of directors shall
hold an organization meeting to adopt
bylaws, elect directors to serve until the
successors are elected at the first annual
meeting of stockholders, elect officers,
and transact other business before the
meeting. A meeting is not required if
each incorporator or director consents,
in writing, to taking the actions which
would have been taken at a meeting.
§109. Bylaws.
The incorporators or initial directors, or
if the corporation has not received
payment for stock, the board of
directors, may adopt, amend, or
repealed the original bylaws.
The bylaws may contain any lawful
provision, consistent with the certificate
of incorporation, that relates to the
business of the corporation or the
powers of its stockholders, directors,
officers, or employees.
§110. Emergency bylaws and other powers in
emergency.
The board of directors may adopt
emergency bylaws, which are subject to
change by the stockholders. The
emergency bylaws may include any
provision practical and necessary for
circumstances of the emergency.
Regular bylaws consistent with the
emergency bylaws remain in effect
during an emergency. No officer,
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corporation, and carry on any other
business brought before the meeting. A
meeting is not required if each
incorporator or director consents, in
writing, to taking the actions which
would have been taken at a meeting.

§106. Bylaws.
The incorporators or board of directors
of a corporation shall adopt initial
bylaws for the corporation. The bylaws
may contain any lawful provision,
consistent with the charter of the
corporation, for managing the business
and affairs of the corporation.

§107. Emergency bylaws.
Unless the charter provides otherwise,
the board of directors or the
incorporators of a corporation may
adopt emergency bylaws, which are
subject to change by the shareholders.
Emergency bylaws may include all
provisions necessary for managing the
corporation during, but not after, the
emergency. Regular bylaws consistent
with the emergency bylaws remain in
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director, or employee acting in
accordance with emergency bylaws shall
be liable except for willful misconduct.
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effect during an emergency. Corporate
action taken in good faith in accordance
with the emergency bylaws bind the
corporation and may not be used to
impose liability on a corporate director,
officer, employee, or agent.

§111. Interpretation and enforcement of the
certificate of incorporation and bylaws.
C. Purposes and Powers
48-13-101 to 48-13-104.
§101. Incorporators; how corporation formed;
§101. Purposes.
purposes.
Every corporation has the purpose of
A corporation may be incorporated to
engaging in any lawful business unless a
conduct or promote any lawful business
more limited purpose is set forth in the
or purpose, except as otherwise provided charter.
by the laws of the State of Delaware or
the United States Constitution.
§121. General Powers.
§102. General powers.
Every corporation, its officers, directors, Generally, a corporation, like an
and stockholders shall possess all
individual, has the power to do all things
powers and privileges granted by this
necessary to carry out its business and
chapter as necessary to conduct the
affairs. The statute lists specific powers
business and promote the purposes set
of a corporation. Unless otherwise
forth in its articles of incorporation.
provided by its charter, the duration of a
§122. Specific powers.
corporation and succession of the
The statute lists specific powers of a
corporate name is perpetual.
corporation.
§110. Emergency bylaws and other powers in
§103. Emergency powers.
emergency.
The board of directors may modify lines
The board may modify lines of
of succession and relocate or designate
succession or change the head office as
alternative principal offices as necessary
necessary for an emergency. Notice of a for an emergency. During an
meeting of the board during an
emergency, notice of a meeting of the
emergency is only required where
board is required only when practicable,
feasible unless otherwise provided in the and officers present at the meeting may
emergency bylaws.
be deemed directors as necessary to
achieve a quorum.
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§124. Effect of lack of corporate capacity or
§104. Ultra vires actions.
power; ultra vires.
A corporation’s power to act may be
No act of a corporation and no transfer
challenged only by (1) a shareholder to
of property to or by a corporation shall
enjoin the act; (2) by the corporation
be invalid by reason of lack of power or
against an incumbent or former director,
capacity, but a stockholder, the
officer, employee, or agent; or (3) by the
corporation, or the Attorney General
attorney general and reporter in an
may assert lack of capacity or power in a action for judicial dissolution.
proceeding against the corporation.
§123. Powers respecting securities of other
corporations or entities.
§125. Conferring academic or honorary degrees.
§126. Banking power denied.
§127.Private foundation; powers and duties.
D. Name
48-14-101 to 48-14-103.
§102(a)(1). Generally, a corporate name
§101. Corporate name.
shall contain the word “corporation” or a Generally, a corporate name must
similar word or abbreviation; shall be
contain the word “corporation,” the
distinguishable from the name of other
abbreviation “corp.,” or similar
state entities; and shall not contain the
language, unless formed for the purpose
word “bank.”
of banking or insurance. A corporate
name, unless authorized, may not imply
power to transact business, affiliation
with organizations, or agency for the
United States or Tennessee. A
corporate name must be distinguishable
from corporations authorized to
transact business in Tennessee. A
foreign or domestic corporation may
adopt a corporate name while applying
for authority to transact business.
§102. Reserved name.
A person may reserve the exclusive use
of a corporate name for a period of four
months by application to the secretary
of state.
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§103. Registered name.
A foreign corporation may register its
corporate name for exclusive use
through the end of the calendar year of
registration by application to the
secretary of state. Registration may be
renewed annually by application
between October 1 and December 31 of
the preceding year.
E. Officer and Agent
48-15-101 to 48-15-105.
§131. Registered office in State; principal office §101. Registered office and registered agent.
or place of business in State.
A corporation must continuously
Every corporation shall have and
maintain a registered office and a
maintain a registered office in Delaware. registered agent in Tennessee. The
§132. Registered agent in State; resident agent.
agent may be (1) an individual resident
Every corporation shall have and
in Tennessee, (2) a domestic
maintain a registered agent in Delaware.
corporation, or (3) a foreign corporation
The agent may be (1) the corporation
authorized to transact business in
itself; (2) an individual resident in
Tennessee. If a registered agent resigns
Delaware; (3) a domestic corporation,
or is otherwise unable to perform the
limited partnership, limited liability
duties of the agent, the corporation shall
company, or business trust; or (4)
promptly designate another registered
foreign corporation, limited partnership, agent.
or limited liability company authorized
to do business in Delaware.
§103. Resignation of registered agent.
§135. Resignation of registered agent coupled
A registered agent may resign by signing
with appointment of successor.
and filing, with the secretary of state, a
The registered agent may resign and
appoint a successor by filing a certificate statement of resignation with a
certification that the registered agent has
accompanied by statement of the
mailed a copy to the principal office of
corporation ratifying and approving the
the corporation by certified mail.
substitution. The Secretary of State
shall then issue a certificate ratifying and
approving the change.
§136. Resignation of registered agent not
coupled with appointment of successor.
The registered agent may resign without
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appointing a successor, but the
resignation will not become effective
until thirty days after the agent files a
certificate. The corporation must obtain
and designate a new registered agent
within thirty days after the certificate is
filed, or the Secretary of State shall
forfeit the charter.
§133. Change of location of registered office;
§102. Change of registered office or registered
change of registered agent.
agent.
Upon a resolution of the board, a
A corporation may change its registered
corporation may change its registered
office or agent by delivering a statement
office or agent by executing,
of change to the secretary of state.
acknowledging, and filing a certificate
certifying the change.
§134. Change of address or name of registered
agent.
A registered agent may change the
address of the registered office or the
agent’s name by executing and
acknowledging a certificate setting forth
the new address or name and filing the
certificate with the Secretary of State.
§104. Service on corporation.
§321. Service of process on corporations.
A corporation’s agent for service of
Service of process upon a corporation
process, notice, or demand is the
shall be made by delivering a copy
personally to any officer, director, or the registered agent. If a corporation’s
agent is unavailable, then the secretary
registered agent of the corporation in
of state shall be the corporation’s agent
Delaware, or by leaving the copy at the
for service.
dwelling house in Delaware of any
officer or at the registered office or
other place of business of the
corporation. If the registered agent is a
corporation, service of process may be
made by serving, in Delaware, a copy on
an officer or director of the registered
agent. If service cannot be made in this
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Secretary of State.
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§105. Procedure for service on domestic or
foreign corporation by service on secretary of
state.
Service on the secretary of state, as an
agent of a corporation, shall be made by
delivering the original and one copy,
certified by the clerk of court, with the
proper fee. The secretary of state shall
send the copy to the corporation at its
registered office. The defendant shall
not be required to appear and no
judgment shall be taken against the
defendant before one month after
service is completed.
§322. Failure of corporation to obey order of
court; appointment of receiver.
§323. Failure of corporation to obey writ of
mandamus; quo warranto proceedings for
forfeiture of charter.
§324. Attachment of shares of stock or any
option, right or interest therein; procedure; sale;
title upon sale; proceeds.
F. Shares and Distributions
Part 1. Shares
48-16-101 to 48-16-104.
§151. Classes and series of stock; redemption;
§101. Authorized shares.
rights.
The charter must designate the number
A corporation may issue one or more
of shares of each class that a
classes of stock or series of stock within corporation is authorized to issue. For
a class as stated in the certificate of
each class, the charter must describe a
incorporation or as authorized by
distinguishing designation, preferences,
resolution of the board.
limitations, and relative rights. The
charter must authorize (1) one or more
classes that have unlimited voting rights
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and (2) one or more classes of shares
that are entitled to receive the net assets
of the corporation upon dissolution.
§102.Terms of Class or Series Determined by
Board of Directors.
If so provided in the charter, the board
may determine the preferences,
limitations, and relative rights of a class
or series of a class of shares before
issuance. Prior to issuing shares created
by the board, articles of amendment
must be filed with the secretary of state.

§151(g). When the board adopts a
resolution to (1) issue shares of stock of
any class, or series of a class, not set
forth in the certificate of incorporation
or (2) increase or decrease the number of
shares of a series, a certificate of
designations shall be executed,
acknowledged, and filed setting forth a
copy of the resolution and stating the
number of shares of such class or series.
§151(b). Following a redemption of
§103. Issued and outstanding shares.
shares by the corporation, the
Issued shares are outstanding until
corporation shall have at least one share
reacquired, redeemed, converted, or
of a class or series of stock with full
cancelled. If there are outstanding
voting powers.
shares, (1) at least one share with
§243. Retirement of stock.
unlimited voting rights and (2) at least
By resolution of the board, a
one share entitled to receive the net
corporation may retire any shares of its assets of the corporation upon
capital stock that are issued but are not dissolution must be outstanding.
outstanding.
§244. Reduction of capital.
By resolution of the board, a
corporation may reduce its capital.
§155. Fraction of shares.
§104. Fractional shares.
A corporation may issue fractions of a
A corporation may (1) issue fractions of
share. If no fractional shares are issued, a share, (2) arrange for disposal of
the corporation must (1) arrange for
fractional shares, and (3) issue scrip
disposition of fractional interests, (2)
entitling the holder to receive a full
pay fair value in cash for fractional
share in return for enough scrip to equal
shares, or (3) issue scrip or warrants
a full share. The holder of a fractional
entitling the holder to a full share upon
share is entitled to the rights of a
surrender of such scrip or warrants
shareholder, but the holder of scrip is
equaling a full share. The holder of a
not entitled to such rights unless
fractional share is entitled to exercise the provided in the scrip.
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Part 2. Issuance of Shares
48-16-201 to 48-16-208.
§161. Issuance of additional stock; when and by §201. Subscription for shares.
whom.
A subscription for shares entered into
The board may issue or take
before incorporation shall be in writing
subscriptions for additional shares of
and shall be irrevocable for six months,
capital stock up to the amount
unless otherwise specified in the
authorized in the certificate of
subscription agreement. Shares issued
incorporation.
pursuant to such an agreement are fully
§152. Issuance of stock; lawful consideration;
paid and nonassessable when the
fully paid stock.
corporation receives the consideration
If the full amount of consideration for
for the shares. If a subscriber defaults
purchase of capital stock is paid as
in payment for shares issued pursuant to
required by the board, the stock is
a pre-incorporation subscription, the
issued as fully paid and nonassessable.
corporation may (1) collect the amount
§153. Consideration for stock.
owed as a debt, or, (2) if left unpaid for
Shares of stock with or without par
more than twenty days after written
value may be issued for consideration,
demand for payment, rescind the
provided that consideration is not less
agreement and sell the shares. A
than par value. Treasury shares may be subscription agreement entered into
disposed of for consideration
after incorporation shall be in writing
determined by the board or, if the
and is a contract for issuance of shares.
certificate of incorporation so
§202. Issuance of shares.
provides, by stockholders.
The board of directors may authorize
§156. Partly paid shares.
shares to be issued for adequate
A corporation may issue the whole or
consideration. This power of the board
any part of its shares as partly paid and may be reserved to the shareholders by
subject to call for the payment of the
the charter. Shares are issued, fully paid,
balance of the consideration.
and nonassessable when the corporation
§165. Revocability of preincorporation
receives adequate consideration. The
subscriptions.
corporation may place shares in escrow
Unless otherwise provided by the terms
for a contract for future services or
of the subscription, a subscription for
other consideration.
stock shall be irrevocable for six months
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except with the consent of all
subscribers or the corporation.
§166. Formalities required of stock
subscriptions.
Whether made before or after the
formation of a corporation, a
subscription for stock must be in
writing and signed by the subscriber or
subscriber’s agent.
§162. Liability of stockholder or subscriber for
stock not paid in full.
When consideration has not been paid
in full and the assets of the corporation
are insufficient to satisfy the claims of
creditors, each holder or subscriber of
such unpaid shares shall be bound to
pay the balance of consideration.
Unpaid amounts may be recovered after
a writ of execution as provided in §325.
§163. Payment for stock not paid in full.
The board may demand payment from
the holder of a share not paid in full for
sums necessary for the business thirty
days after providing notice of such
demand.
§164. Failure to pay for stock; remedies.
A corporation may collect unpaid
balances from the stockholder by an
action at law or may sell the part of the
shares of the delinquent stockholder
that will pay all demands due as well as
interest and incidental expenses.
§173. Declaration and payment of dividends.
Dividends may be paid in cash,
property, or shares of the
corporation’s capital stock.
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§203. Liability of shareholders.
A purchaser of shares is only liable to
the corporation for the consideration
for which the shares are issued. A
shareholder is not personally liable for
the acts or debts of a corporation except
where the shareholder becomes
personally liable by reason of the
shareholder’s own acts.

§204. Share dividends.
Unless provided otherwise in the
charter, a corporation may issue share
dividends by issuing shares pro rata and
without consideration to shareholders.
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§157. Rights and options respecting stock.
Unless otherwise provided in the
certificate of incorporation, a
corporation may create and issue rights
or options to purchase shares of its
capital stock.
§151(f). If a corporation is authorized to
issue more than one class of stock or
more than one series of any class, the
powers, designations preferences, and
rights of each shall be set forth in the
stock certificate.
§158. Stock certificates, uncertificated shares.
The shares of a corporation may be
represented by certificates, but the
board may provide, by resolution, for
uncertificated shares. Every holder of
stock shall be entitled to have a
certificate signed by the corporation.
§151(f). Within a reasonable time after
the transfer of uncertificated stock, the
corporation shall send to the registered
owner a written notice containing the
information required to be set forth in a
certificate.
§202. Restrictions on transfer and ownership of
securities.
A written restriction on the transfer of
securities is enforceable against the
holder of the restricted security if
authorized and if noted conspicuously
on the certificate. The statute lists
actions authorized as restrictions.
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§205. Options to subscribe for or purchase
shares. Instruments evidencing options.
Authority to grant.
Unless otherwise provided in the
charter, the board of directors may grant
rights, options, or warrants to subscribe
for or to purchase shares of any
authorized class.
§206. Form and content of certificate.
Shares may be, but are not required to
be, represented by certificates. Each
certificate must state on its face (1) the
name of the corporation and
organization under the laws of
Tennessee; (2) the name of the bearer;
(3) the number and class of shares and
the designation of the series represented
by the certificate; and (4) a summary of
designations, rights, preferences, and
limitations applicable to each class and
series. Each certificate shall be signed
by two officers and may bear the
corporate seal.
§207. Shares without certificates.
Within a reasonable time after the issue
or transfer of shares without
certificates, the corporation shall send
the shareholder a written statement of
the information required to be stated
on the face of a certificate.
§208. Restriction on transfer of shares and other
securities.
Transfer, or registration of transfer, of
shares may be restricted by the
corporation. A restriction is not
enforceable unless authorized by this
section and noted conspicuously on the
certificate or statement of information.
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§203. Business combinations with interested
stockholders.

§151(b). Any stock of any class or series
may be made subject to redemption by
the corporation.
§160. Corporation’s powers respecting
ownership, voting, etc., of its own stock; rights of
stock called for redemption.
Generally, a corporation may purchase,
redeem, receive, take or otherwise
acquire, own and hold, sell, lend,
exchange, transfer or otherwise deal in
and with its own shares. However, a
corporation may not do so if the capital
is impaired or if such action will result in
impairing capital. The corporation may
not purchase for more than the price at
which the share may be redeemed.
§151(c). The holders of preferred or
special stock shall be entitled to receive
dividends payable in preference to other
classes or series of stock, as stated in the
certificate of incorporation or in a
resolution adopted by the board. After
dividends are paid or declared, a
dividend on the remaining classes or
series of stock may then be paid.
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Part 3. Subsequent Acquisition of
Shares by Shareholders and
Corporation
48-16-301 to 48-16-302.
§301. Shareholders’ preemptive rights.
Shareholders do not have a preemptive
right to acquire unissued shares except
to the extent provided in the charter.
§302. Corporation’s acquisition of its own
shares.
Shares of the corporation acquired by
the corporation itself shall constitute
authorized but unissued shares. If the
charter prohibits the reissue of acquired
shares, the number of authorized shares
is reduced by the number of shares
acquired. This is effective upon
adoption of articles of amendment for
which shareholder action is unnecessary.

Part 4. Distributions
48-16-401.
§401. Distributions to shareholders.
The board of directors may authorize
the corporation to make distributions to
the shareholders. However, no
distribution may be made if, after giving
it effect, (1) the corporation would be
unable to pay debts as they come due in
the usual course of business, or (2) the
corporation’s total assets would be less
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§170. Dividends; payment; wasting asset
than total liabilities plus the amount
corporation.
necessary to satisfy preferential rights
The board may declare dividends out of superior to those receiving the
its surplus. If capital is less than the
distribution if the corporation were to
capital represented by the issued and
be dissolved.
outstanding stock, the corporation shall
not declare and pay dividends.
§171. Special purpose reserves.
The board may set apart a reserve fund
for any proper purpose from the funds
available for dividends.
§173. Declaration and payment of dividends.
Dividends may be paid in cash, property,
or shares of the corporation’s capital
stock.
§154. Determination of amount of capital;
capital, surplus and net assets defined.
By resolution of the board, a
corporation may determine that only
part of the consideration, received in
exchange for capital stock, shall
represent capital, provided that capital
is not less than aggregate par value of
shares issued with a par value.
G. Shareholders
Part 1. Meetings
48-17-101 to 48-17-109.
§211. Meetings of stockholders.
§101. Annual meeting.
Meetings of stockholders may be held at A corporation shall hold an annual
the place designated in the certificate of
meeting of shareholders at a time stated
incorporation or bylaws or as
in the bylaws.
determined by the board. If authorized
by the board of directors, stockholders
may participate and be deemed present
by means of remote communication.
An annual meeting of stockholders shall
be held for the election of directors.
Unless provided otherwise in the
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certificate of incorporation,
stockholders may act by written consent
without a meeting to elect directors if all
directorships which could be elected at
the meeting are vacant and are filled by
such action.
§211(d). Special meetings of stockholders
may be called by the board of directors
or such persons as authorized by the
certificate of incorporation or bylaws.

§228. Consent of stockholders or members in
lieu of meeting.
Unless otherwise provided in the
certificate of incorporation, any action
required to be taken at an annual or
special stockholders’ meeting may be
taken without a meeting, prior notice, or
a vote, if a consent is signed by the
holders of outstanding stock having not
less than the minimum votes necessary
to authorize the action at a meeting
where all shares entitled to vote were
present and voting.
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§102. Special meeting.
A corporation shall hold a special
meeting of shareholders (1) at the call of
the board of directors or a person
authorized by the charter or bylaws or
(2) as demanded by at least ten percent
of the votes entitled to be cast on any
issued proposed to be considered at the
special meeting. Only business within
the purpose described in the meeting
noticed may be conducted at the special
meeting.
§103. Court-ordered meeting.
A court may summarily order a meeting
upon application of a shareholder.
§104. Action without a meeting.
Action required or permitted to be
taken at a shareholders’ meeting may be
taken without a meeting if all
shareholders entitled to vote on the
action consent.
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§222. Notice of meetings and adjourned
§105.Notice of meeting.
meetings.
A corporation shall notify the
A written notice shall be given to
shareholders, who are entitled to vote,
stockholders required or permitted to
of the meeting no fewer than ten days
take action at a meeting. Such notice
and no more than two months before
shall be given not less than ten days nor
meeting date. Notice of an annual
more than sixty days before the date of
meeting is not required to describe the
the meeting. When a meeting is
purpose of the meeting, but notice of a
adjourned to another time and place,
special meeting must describe the
unless otherwise require by the bylaws,
purpose of the meeting.
notice is not required if details are
announced at the meeting at which the
adjournment is taken, unless the
adjournment is for more than thirty
days.
§232. Notice by electronic transmission.
Any notice to stockholders given by the
corporation shall be effective if given by
a form of electronic transmission
consented to by the stockholder
receiving the notice.
§229. Waiver of notice.
§106. Waiver of notice.
Whenever notice is required to be given, A shareholder may waive notice before
a written waiver signed by the person
or after the date and time stated in the
entitled to notice shall be deemed
notice by delivery of a written waiver to
equivalent to notice. Attendance of a
the corporation. Unless the shareholder
person at a meeting shall constitute a
objects at the beginning of the meeting,
waiver of notice of such a meeting,
a shareholder’s attendance at a meeting
except when a person attends for the
(1) waives objection to lack of notice
express purpose of objecting because
and (2) waives objection to
the meeting was not lawfully called or
consideration of a particular matter not
convened.
specified in the notice.
§213. Fixing date for determination of
§107. Record date.
stockholders of record.
The bylaws may provide the manner of
The board may fix a record date, subject fixing the record date for a voting group
to time requirements listed in the
to determine the shareholders entitled to
statute, to determine the stockholders
take an action. A record date may not
entitled to (1) notice of or to vote at a
be more than more than seventy days
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corporate action in writing without a
meeting, and (3) receive payment of any
dividend or distribution. The statute
provides for a default date where the
board does not fix a date.
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before the action.

§108. Waiver or approval by fiduciaries.
A fiduciary who is a shareholder of
record may waive notice and may
consent to taking a corporate action
without a meeting.
§211(a). If authorized by the board of
§109. Shareholder meetings through special
directors, stockholders may participate
communication.
and be deemed present by means of
Unless provided otherwise in the charter
remote communication.
or bylaws, the corporation may permit
participation in a regular or special
meeting through the use of any means
of communication by which
shareholders participating may
simultaneously hear each other during
the meeting.
Part 2. Voting
48-17-201 to 48-17-210.
§201. Shareholders’ list for meeting.
§219. List of stockholders entitled to vote;
After fixing the record date for a
penalty for refusal to produce stock ledger.
meeting, a corporation shall prepare an
At least ten days before a stockholder
alphabetical list of all shareholders
meeting, the officer who has charge of
the stock ledger shall prepare; and make entitled to notice of the meeting. The
a list of the stockholders entitled to vote list must be arranged by voting group
and list the address and number of
at the meeting. The list should be
shares held by each shareholder. The
arranged in alphabetical order showing
the name, address and number of shares list must be available for inspection by
any shareholder two business days after
registered in the name of each
notice of the meeting, and the
stockholder. The list shall be open for
examination at least ten days prior to the corporation must make the list available
at the meeting.
meeting on a reasonably accessible
electronic network, provided that
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information required to gain access is
provided in the meeting notice, during
ordinary business hours at the principal
place of business of the corporation.
The list should be available during the
meeting whether held at a place or by
remote communication. Willful neglect
or refusal of the directors to provide the
list at any meeting for election of
directors shall result in ineligibility for
election to any office at that meeting.
§212. Voting rights of stockholders; proxies;
limitations.
Unless otherwise provided in the
certificate of incorporation, each
stockholder shall be entitled to one vote
for each share of capital stock.
§212(b-e). Each stockholder entitled to
vote may authorize another person to act
for such stockholder by proxy. A proxy
may be acted on for only three years,
unless the proxy provides for a longer
period. A proxy shall be irrevocable if
(1) expressly stated in the proxy and (2)
the proxy is coupled with an interest
sufficient in law to support the
irrevocable power.
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§202. Voting entitlement of shares.
Unless the charter or bylaws provide
otherwise, each outstanding share is
entitled to one vote on each matter
voted on at a shareholders’ meeting.
§203. Proxies.
A shareholder may vote in person or by
proxy. The statute lists valid means by
which a shareholder may authorize
another to act as proxy. An
appointment of proxy is effective for
eleven months when received by the
agent authorized to tabulate votes. An
appointment of a proxy is revocable
unless the appointment form states that
it is irrevocable and is coupled with an
interest. The statute lists the scope of
such an interest.
§204. Shares held by nominees.
A corporation may establish a procedure
to recognize the beneficial owner of
shares as the shareholder when the
shares are registered in the name of a
nominee.
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§216. Quorum and required vote for stock
corporations.
The certificate of incorporation or
bylaws may specify the number of
shares which shall be present to
constitute a quorum for the transaction
of business, but the specified number
shall not be less than one-third of the
shares entitled to vote at a meeting. In
the absence of such specification, the
statute provides a default requirement
for a quorum.
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§205. Corporation’s acceptance of votes.
If the name signed on a vote, consent,
waiver, or proxy appointment
corresponds to the name of a
shareholder, the corporation is entitled
to accept the signed document as the act
of the shareholder. If the name signed
does not correspond to the name of the
shareholder, the statute lists
circumstances under which the
corporation may give the signed
document effect as an act of the
shareholder. The corporation may
reject a vote, consent, waiver, or proxy
appointment if there is reasonable basis
to doubt validity of the signature.
§206. Quorum and voting requirements for
voting groups.
Shares entitled to vote as a separate
voting group may take action only if a
quorum exists. A majority of the votes
entitled to be cast constitutes a quorum
unless provided otherwise in the charter.
If a quorum exists, action on a matter is
approved if the number of votes in
favor of the action is greater than the
number of votes opposing the action.
§207. Action by single and multiple voting
groups.
If the charter provides for voting by a
single voting group on a matter, action
is taken when voted upon by the group
as provided in §206. If the charter
provides for voting by two or more
groups on a matter, action is taken only
when voted upon by each group
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counted separately as provided in §206.
§208. Greater quorum or voting requirements.
The charter may provide for a greater
quorum or voting requirement for
shareholders.
§160(c). If a corporation holds a majority §209. Voting for directors. Cumulative voting.
of the shares of its own stock entitled to
Unless otherwise provided in the
vote in the election of directors, such
charter, directors are elected by a
shares are not entitled to vote and may
plurality of the votes cast by the shares
not be counted for quorum purposes.
entitled to vote in the election at the
§211(e). All elections of directors shall be meeting at which a quorum is present.
by written ballot unless otherwise
Unless so provided in the charter,
provided in the certificate of
shareholders do not have the right to
incorporation. If authorized by the
cumulate their votes for directors. If
board, the ballot may be submitted by
cumulative voting is allowed in the
electronic transmission.
charter, shareholders may multiply the
§214. Cumulative voting.
number of votes they are entitled to cast
The certificate of incorporation may
by the number of directors for whom
provide that for an election of directors, they are entitled to vote and cast the
each stockholder shall be entitled to
product for a single candidate or
votes equaling the number of votes a
distribute the product among two or
stockholder would be entitled to cast
more candidates. Shares otherwise
based on number of shares held
entitled to vote cumulatively may do so
multiplied by the number of directors
(1) only if the meeting notice or proxy
being elected. A stockholder may cast
statement authorizes or (2) if the
all such votes for a single director or
shareholder gives notice to the
distribute the votes as the stockholder
corporation at least forty-eight hours
sees fit.
before the meeting.
Part 3. Voting Trusts and
Shareholders’ Agreements
48-17-301 to 48-17-302.
§218. Voting trusts or other voting agreements. §301. Voting trusts.
Stockholders may, by written agreement, One or more shareholders may create a
deposit or transfer capital stock of an
voting trust by signing an agreement of
original issue to a person or entity
the provisions of the trust and
authorized to act as trustee for the
transferring their shares to a trustee.
purpose of voting. After a copy of the
The trustee shall deliver a copy of the
agreement is filed with the registered
agreement and a list of the names and
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office of the corporation, certificates of
stock or uncertificated shares shall be
issued to the trustee.
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addresses of all owners of beneficial
interest to the corporation. A voting
trust is valid for not more than ten years
after its effective date unless extended
by ten year terms.
§302. Shareholders’ agreements.
A signed agreement between two or
more shareholders may provide that the
shares held by parties to the agreement
shall be voted as provided in the
agreement and may be specially
enforced.

§217. Voting rights of fiduciaries, pledgors, and
joint owners of stock.
Persons holding stock in a fiduciary
capacity shall be entitled to vote the
shares so held. Persons whose stock is
pledged shall be entitled to vote unless
the holder expressly empowered the
pledgee to vote. If shares are held by
two or more persons, (1) the vote of
one binds all owners; (2) the majority
vote binds all owners if more than one
votes; and (3) if more than one vote and
the vote is split, each faction may vote
proportionally.
Part 4. Derivative Proceedings
48-17-401.
§401. Procedure in Derivative Proceedings.
A proceeding, in the right of a
corporation, may only be commenced
by a person who was a shareholder of
the corporation when the transaction
complained of occurred. The complaint
must be verified and alleged with
particularity. Such a proceeding may
not be discontinued or settled without a
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court’s approval.

§215. Voting rights of members of nonstock
corporations; quorum; proxies.
§225. Contested election of directors; proceedings
to determine validity.
§226. Appointment of custodian or receiver of
corporation on deadlock or for other cause.
§227. Powers of Court in elections of directors.
§231. Voting procedures and inspectors of
elections.
H. Directors and Officers
Part 1. Board of Directors
48-18-101 to 48-18-111.
§141. Board of directors; powers; number,
§101. Requirement for and duties of board of
qualifications, terms and quorum; committees;
directors.
classes of directors; nonprofit corporations;
A board of directors will exercise all
reliance upon books; action without meeting;
corporate powers and manage the
removal.
business and affairs of the corporation.
Unless otherwise provided in the
However, a corporation with fifty or
certificate of incorporation, a board of
fewer shareholders is not required to
directors shall manage the business and
have a board of directors, if the
affairs of the corporation.
corporation describes in its charter who
will perform the duties of the board of
directors.
§141(b). The certificate of incorporation
§102. Qualifications of directors.
or the bylaws may specify qualifications
Qualifications for directors may be
for directors, but unless specified, a
specified in the charter or bylaws.
director is not required to be a
Unless required by the charter or
stockholder.
bylaws, a director is not required to be a
resident of Tennessee or a shareholder
of the corporation.
§141(b). The board shall consist of at
§103. Number and election of directors.
least one person. Unless the total
A board must consist of at least one
number of directors is specified in the
individual. The total number of
certificate of incorporation, the number
directors shall be listed in the charter or
shall be specified in the bylaws. If the
bylaws. Directors are elected at the first
number of directors is specified in the
annual shareholders’ meeting and at
certificate, a change may be made only
each annual meeting thereafter. Unless
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the charter or bylaws permits the board
to change the number of directors, only
the shareholders have such power.
§104. Election of directors by certain classes of
shareholders.
If the charter authorizes shares to be
divided into classes or series, the charter
may also authorize the election of the
directors by the holders of one or more
authorized classes or series of shares.
§141(b). Each director shall hold office
§105. Terms of directors generally.
until a successor is elected and qualified
The terms of the initial directors expire
or until the director resigns or is
at the first shareholders’ meeting at
removed.
which directors are elected. The terms
of all other directors expire at the next
annual shareholders’ meeting following
their election, unless their terms are
staggered or terms are for more than
one year as provided by the charter.
Despite the expiration of a director’s
term, the director continues to serve
until a successor is elected.
§141(d). The certificate of incorporation
§106. Staggered terms for directors.
may empower the stockholders of any
The charter may provide for staggered
class or series to elect directors that serve terms by grouping the directors into two
for different terms. The certificate of
or three groups and designating
incorporation or bylaws may divide the
expiration of the terms of the first
directors into one, two, or three classes.
group of directors at the first annual
The terms of the directors in the first
shareholders’ meeting after their
class expire at the next annual meeting;
election. The terms of the second
the terms of the directors in the second
group of directors will expire at the
class expire one year later; and the terms
second annual shareholders’ meeting
of the directors in the third class expire
after their election. At each subsequent
two years later. At subsequent annual
annual shareholders’ meeting, directors
meetings, directors shall be elected for
will be elected for terms of two or three
full term to succeed the directors whose
years.
terms expire.
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by giving written or electronic notice to
the corporation.
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§107. Resignation of directors.
A director may resign at any time by
delivering written notice to the board of
directors, its chair or president, or to the
corporation.
§141(k). The stockholders may remove a §108. Removal of directors.
director without cause. If the
The shareholders may remove directors
corporation has cumulative voting and
with or without cause unless the charter
less than the entire board is to be
provides removal only for cause. If a
removed, the stockholders may not
director is elected by a voting group of
remove a director without cause if the
shareholders, only the shareholders of
votes against removal would be sufficient that voting group may participate in the
to elect the director or if the director is
vote to remove the director without
part of a class. If the board is classified,
cause. If cumulative voting is
the stockholders may only remove a
authorized, a director may not be
director with cause.
removed if the number of votes
sufficient to elect the director under
cumulative voting is voted against the
directors’ removal. If cumulative voting
is not authorized, a director may be
removed if the number of votes cast to
remove the director exceeds the number
cast not to remove. If provided by the
charter, the board may remove any or all
the directors by a vote of the majority of
the entire board. The shareholders may
only remove directors at a meeting
called for the purpose of removing the
director.
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§109. Removal of directors by judicial
proceeding.
A court may remove a director in a
proceeding commenced by the
corporation or its shareholders holding
at least ten percent of the outstanding
shares of any class.
§110. Vacancy on board.
Unless the charter provides otherwise, a
vacancy on the board may be filled by
the shareholders or the board.

§223. Vacancies and newly created
directorships.
Unless otherwise provided in the
certificate of incorporation or bylaws,
vacancies and newly created
directorships maybe filled by a majority
of the directors then in office.
§141(h). Unless otherwise restricted by
§111. Compensation of directors.
the certificate of incorporation or bylaws, Unless the charter or bylaws provide
the board has the authority to fix
otherwise, the board may fix the
compensation of directors.
compensation of the directors.
Part 2. Meetings and Actions of the
Board
48-18-201 to 48-18-206.
§141(g). Unless otherwise restricted by
§201. Meetings.
the certificate of incorporation or bylaws, The board may hold regular or special
the board may hold meetings in or
meetings in or out of Tennessee. Unless
outside of Delaware.
the bylaws provide otherwise, special
§141(i). Unless otherwise restricted by
meetings may be called by the chair of
the certificate of incorporation or bylaws, the board, the president, or any two
directors may participate in a board
directors. Unless the charter or bylaws
meeting by telephone conference or
provide otherwise, the board may
other means by which all participants
permit participation in a regular or
may hear each other. Such participation
special meeting through the use of any
constitutes presence at the meeting.
means of communication by which
directors participating may
simultaneously hear each other during
the meeting.
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§141(f). Unless otherwise restricted in the §202. Action without meeting.
certificate of incorporation or bylaws, an
Action required, or permitted to be
action of the board may be taken without taken, at a board of directors’ meeting
a meeting if all members of the board
may be taken without a meeting if all
consent in writing or electronically.
directors entitled to vote on the action
Consent shall be filed with the minutes
consent.
of board proceedings in the same form
as received.
§203. Notice of meeting.
Unless the charter or bylaws provide
otherwise, regular meetings of the board
of directors may be held without notice,
but special meetings require notice of at
least two days before the meeting.
§204. Waiver of notice.
A director may waive any notice
required by filing a signed waiver in the
minutes or corporate records. A
director’s participation in a meeting
waives any required notice unless the
director objects at the beginning of the
meeting and does not vote.
§141(b). Unless the certificate of
§205. Quorum and voting.
incorporation or bylaws requires a
If the board has a fixed size, a quorum
greater number, a majority of the total
consists of a majority of the fixed
number of directors is a quorum for the
number of directors. If the board has a
transaction of business. Unless the
variable size, a quorum consists of a
certificate of incorporation provides
majority of the number of directors
otherwise, the bylaws may provide that a
prescribed or the number of directors in
number less than a majority constitutes a office directly immediately before the
quorum, provided that number may not
meeting. The charter or bylaws may
be less than one-third the total number
authorize a quorum of greater size but
of directors. Unless the certificate of
no fewer than one-third of the fixed or
incorporation or bylaws requires a
prescribed number of directors. If a
greater number, a vote of the majority of quorum is present when a vote is taken,
directors present at a meeting where a
the affirmative vote of a majority of the
quorum is present shall be an act of the
directors present is an act of the board.
board.
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§141(j). A corporation that is not
authorized to issue capital stock may
provide that less than one-third of the
members of the governing body may
constitute a quorum. References to the
board or to the stockholders shall be
deemed to refer to the governing body
of such corporation.
§141(c). The board may designate
committees consisting of at least one
director. A committee may exercise all
powers and authority of the board in the
management of the business and affairs
of the board. The statute lists specific
matters for which a committee may not
have authority or power, including
approving actions expressly requiring
stockholder approval and adopting,
amending or approving bylaws.
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§206. Committees.
Unless the charter or bylaws provide
otherwise, the board may create
committees. A committee may consist
of just one member, but all members of
a committee that exercise powers of the
board must be members of the board.
The statute lists specific activities that
may not be conducted by a committee,
including authorizing distributions and
adopting, amending, or repealing
bylaws.
Part 3. Standards of Conduct
48-18-301 to 48-18-304.
§141(e). A director performing the
§301. General standards for directors.
director’s duties shall be fully protected
A director shall discharge all duties as a
in relying, in good faith, on the records
director (1) in good faith; (2) with the
of the corporation and upon information care an ordinarily prudent person in a
presented to the corporation as described like position would exercise under
in the statute.
similar circumstances; and (3) in a
manner the director reasonably believes
to be in the best interests of the
corporation.
§144. Interested directors; quorum.
§302. Director and officer conflict of interest.
No contract between a corporation and
A conflict of interest transaction is a
a director, officer, or entity, in which
transaction with the corporation in
one of its directors or officers has an
which a director or officer has a direct
interest, shall be void solely for this
or indirect interest. The corporation
reason if there was proper disclosure of
may not void such a transaction solely
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material facts and approval by the
because of the officer or director’s
stockholders or the board or if the
interest if there was proper disclosure of
transaction was fair to the corporation.
material facts to the board or to the
Interested directors may be included in
shareholder or if the transaction was fair
the determination of a quorum.
to the corporation.
§143. Loans to employees and officers; guaranty §303. Loans to directors and officers.
of obligation of employees and officers.
A corporation may not lend money to
A corporation may lend money to or
or guarantee the obligation of a director
guarantee an obligation of an officer or
or officer unless approved by the
employee, including a director, when the shareholders or the board determines
board reasonably expects such action
the loan or guarantee benefits the
will benefit the corporation. The loan
corporation.
may be with or without interest and may
be secured or unsecured.
§172. Liability of directors and committee
§304. Liability for unlawful distributions.
members as to dividends or stock redemption.
A director who assents to an unlawful
Directors and members of committees
distribution is personally liable to the
of the board may be fully protected in
corporation for the amount of the
relying, in good faith, on the records of distribution that exceeds what could
the corporation to calculate the
have been distributed lawfully. Such
amount of funds available for declaring director is entitled to contribution from
dividends or redeeming stock.
other directors who could be liable for
§174. Liability of directors for unlawful
the same unlawful distribution and each
payment of dividend or unlawful stock purchase
shareholder accepting the distribution
or redemption; exoneration from liability;
with knowledge of its unlawfulness.
contribution among directors; subrogation.
This section applies to directors who
act willfully or negligently to pay
unlawful dividends or make an
unlawful stock purchase or
redemption. Within six years of the
transaction, such directors shall be
jointly and severally liable to the
corporation for the full amount of the
unlawfully paid dividend or stock
purchase or redemption plus interest
from the time the liability accrued.
Such a director is entitled to
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contribution from directors who voted
in favor of the transaction. Such a
director is also entitled to be
subrogated to the rights of the
corporation against stockholders who
participated in the transaction to the
extent of the amount paid in the
transaction.
§142. Officers; titles, duties, selection, term;
failure to elect; vacancies.
A corporation shall have officers for
whom the titles, duties, and manner of
selection are stated in the bylaws or
specified in a resolution of the board.
One officer shall have the duty to
record and maintain minutes of
meetings. Unless otherwise restricted by
the certificate of incorporation or
bylaws, a person may hold more than
one office. An officer shall hold office
until a successor is elected and qualified
or until resignation or removal.
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Part 4. Officers
48-18-401 to 48-18-406.
§401. Required officers.
Every corporation shall have a president
and a secretary as well as other officers
as described in the bylaws or designated
by the board of directors. Unless the
charter or bylaws provide otherwise,
officers shall be elected or appointed by
the board of directors. A duly
appointed officer may appoint officers
or assistant officers if authorized by the
bylaws or the board of directors.

§402. Duties of officers.
Each officer has the authority and shall
perform the duties set forth in the
bylaws or prescribed by the board of
directors.
§403. Standards of conduct for officers.
An officer with discretionary authority
shall discharge all duties under that
authority (1) in good faith; (2) with the
care an ordinarily prudent person in a
like position would exercise under
similar circumstances; and (3) in a
manner the officer reasonably believes
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to be in the best interest of the
corporation.
§404. Resignation and removal of officers.
An officer may resign by delivering
notice to the corporation. The board
may remove any officer with or without
cause.
§405. Contract right of officers.
The appointment of an officer does not
itself create contract rights. An officer’s
removal does not affect the officer’s
contract rights with the corporation, and
an officer’s resignation does not affect
the corporation’s contract rights with
the officer.
§406. Release or assignment of life insurance on
officers.
When a corporation insures the life of
any director, officer, agent, or employee
or when such corporation is named as
beneficiary, authority to take any action
with reference to such insurance shall be
sufficiently evidenced to the insurance
company by a written statement to that
effect.

§141(c). A corporation may secure fidelity
of any or all officers or agents by bond
or otherwise.
Part 5. Indemnification
48-18-501 to 48-18-509.
§145. Indemnification of officers, directors,
§502. Authority to indemnify.
employees, and agents; insurance.
A corporation may indemnify an
A corporation shall have the power to
individual made a party to a proceeding
indemnify a director, officer, employee,
because the individual was a director
or agent of the corporation made a party against the liability incurred in the
in a completed action, suit, or
proceeding if the individual acted
proceeding against the corporation for
reasonably and in good faith. However,
expenses, judgments, fines, and
a corporation may not indemnify a
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settlement actually and reasonably
incurred if the person acted in good
faith. A corporation shall have the
power to indemnify the same type of
person in a proceeding in the right of
the corporation to procure judgment in
favor of the corporation against
expenses actually and reasonably
incurred, except where a person has
been adjudged liable to the corporation.
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director (1) in connection with a
proceeding in the right of the
corporation in which the director was
adjudged liable to the corporation or (2)
in connection with any other proceeding
charging improper benefit to the
director in which the director was
adjudged liable on the basis that
personal benefit was improperly
received by the director.
§507. Indemnification of officers, employees, and
agents.
An officer of the corporation who is not
a director is entitled to mandatory
indemnification and is entitled to apply
for court-ordered indemnification to the
same extent as a director. The
corporation may indemnify and advance
expenses to an officer, employee, or
agent who is not a director to the same
extent as to a director.
§145(c). To the extent that a person was a §503. Mandatory indemnification.
former director or officer has been
Unless limited by its charter, a
successful on the merits or in defense of
corporation shall indemnify a director
any action the person is made a party or
who was wholly successful in the
in the right of the corporation, that
defense of any proceeding to which the
person shall be indemnified against any
director was a party because the director
expense actually and reasonably incurred. is or was a director against reasonable
expenses incurred in connection with
the proceeding.
§145(e). Expenses may be paid in
§504. Advance for expenses.
advance to a director or officer in
A corporation may pay for the
defending a suit provided that the
reasonable expenses incurred by a
director or officer undertakes to repay
director who is a party to a proceeding if
the advance if determined that such
the director provides written affirmation
person is not entitled to indemnification. of the director’s good faith belief that
the director’s actions met the statutory
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standard of conduct, provides a written
undertaking to repay the advance if
determined that the director is not
entitled to indemnification, and
determines the facts then known would
not preclude indemnification.
§145(k). The Court of Chancery is vested §505. Court ordered indemnification.
with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
Unless the charter provides otherwise, a
determine all actions for advancement of court may order indemnification on
expenses or indemnification. The Court
receipt of application of a director of a
may summarily determine a corporation’s corporation who is a party to a
obligation to advance expenses.
proceeding.
§145(d). Any indemnification shall be
§506. Determination and authorization of
made only upon a determination that the indemnification.
present or former director, officer,
A corporation may not indemnify a
employee or agent acted in good faith
director unless authorized after a
and in a manner which the person
determination has been made that the
reasonably to be consistent with the best
indemnification is permissible because
interests of the corporation.
the director met the statutory standard
of conduct. The determination shall be
made by the board, independent special
legal counsel, or the shareholders.
§145(g). A corporation shall have the
§508. Insurance.
power to purchase and maintain
A corporation may purchase and
insurance on behalf of any person who is maintain insurance on behalf of an
or was a director, officer, employee, or
individual who is or was a director,
agent of the corporation or who was
officer, employee, or agent of the
serving at the request of the corporation
corporation, as well as other individuals
as such for another entity against liability as listed in the statute, against liability
incurred by such person acting in such
asserted against or incurred by the
capacity.
individual in that capacity whether or
not the corporation would have the
power to indemnify the individual
against the same liability.
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Part 6. Limitation of Actions
48-18-601.
§601. Limitation of actions for breach of
fiduciary duty.
Any action alleging breach of fiduciary
duties by director or officers must be
brought within one year from the date
of such breach, provided that where the
violation is reasonably not discovered
within the one-year period, the period of
limitation shall be one year from the
date of discovery. In no event shall any
such action be brought more than three
years after the date on which violation
occurred. Where there is fraudulent
concealment on the part of the
defendant, the action shall be
commenced within one year after the
violation is discovered.
I. Amendment of Charter and Bylaws
Part 1. Amendment of Charter
48-20-101 to 48-20-109.
§242. Amendment of certificate of incorporation §101. Authority to amend.
after receipt of payment for stock; nonstock
A corporation may amend its charter at
corporations.
any time. Provisions of the charter and
After a corporation has received
bylaws do not vest shareholders with
payment for any of its capital stock, it
property rights.
may amend its certificate of
§102. Amendment by board of directors.
incorporation. The statute lists the
Unless the charter provides otherwise,
requirements of the board or the
the board may amend the charter
stockholders to make and effect such an without shareholder action to change or
amendment.
delete the names and addresses of initial
directors and registered agent or office;
the address of the principal office; the
corporate name; and convert
outstanding shares of a class into a
greater number of shares.
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§241. Amendment of certificate of incorporation
before receipt of payment for stock.
Before a corporation has received any
payment for any of its stock, it may
amend its certificate of incorporation.
The amendment shall be adopted by a
majority of the incorporators if directors
were not named in the original
certificate of incorporation, or by a
majority of directors who have been
elected and have qualified.
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§103. Amendment by board of directors and
shareholders.
The board may propose amendments to
the charter for adoption by the
shareholders. To adopt the proposed
amendment, a majority of the
shareholder votes entitled to be cast on
the amendment must vote in favor of
the amendment.
§106. Articles of amendment.
A corporation shall file articles of
amendment with the secretary of state
to amend its charter.
§105. Amendment before issuance of shares.
If a corporation has not issued shares,
the board, or the incorporators if there
is no board, may adopt amendments to
the charter.

§104. Voting on amendments by voting groups.
The holders of outstanding shares of a
class are entitled to vote as a separate
voting group if the proposed
amendment would affect the class as
described in the statute.
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§245. Restated certificate of incorporation.
A corporation may adopt a restated
certificate of incorporation to integrate
into a single instrument all the
provisions of the certificate of
incorporation which are operative and
in effect and further amend the
certificate. The manner of stockholder
voting necessary to adopt the restated
certificate is dependent upon whether
an amendment is included with the
restating and integrating.

§109. Bylaws.
After a corporation has received
payment for stock, the power to adopt,
amend, or repeal bylaws shall be in the
stockholders or members entitled to
vote. A corporation may confer power
to adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws
upon the board in the certificate of
incorporation, but this action does not
divest the stockholder or members of
the same power.
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§107. Restated charter.
The board may amend and restate the
charter with or without shareholder
action by filing a restated charter or an
amended and restated charter with the
secretary of state.

§108. Amendment of charter pursuant to
reorganization.
The charter may be amended without
action by the board or the shareholders
where a court orders a plan of
reorganization. Individuals designated
by the court shall file articles of
amendment with the secretary of state.
Part 2. Amendment of Bylaws
48-20-201 to 48-20-203.
§201. Amendment of bylaws by board of
directors or shareholders.
The board may amend or repeal the
bylaws unless (1) the charter reserves
this power exclusively to the
shareholders or (2) the shareholders
expressly provide that the board may
not amend or repeal a specific bylaw.
The shareholders may amend or repeal
the bylaws even though the board has
the same authority.
§202. Bylaw increasing quorum or voting
requirement for shareholders.
If authorized expressly in the charter,
the shareholders may adopt or amend a
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bylaw that fixes a greater quorum or
voting requirement for shareholders.
Such a bylaw may not be adopted,
amended, or repealed by the board.
§203. Bylaw increasing quorum or voting
requirement for directors.
A bylaw that fixes a greater quorum or
voting requirement for the board may
be amended or repealed by (1) the
shareholders if originally adopted by the
shareholders and (2) either the
shareholders or board of directors if
originally adopted by the board of
directors.
J. Merger and Share Exchange
48-21-101 to 48-21-112.
§251. Merger or consolidation of domestic
§102. Merger.
corporations and limited partnership.
One or more corporations may merge
Two or more domestic corporations
to form a corporation, limited liability
may merge into a single corporation,
company, or limited partnership, if the
which may be one of the two existing
board of each adopts and the
corporations or a new corporation.
shareholders approve a plan of merger.
The board of each corporation must
The plan must contain the terms and
adopt a resolution to approve the
conditions of the merger, as well as the
agreement of merger or consolidation
basis of converting existing shares into
and to declare the advisability of the
shares of the new entity.
merger or consolidation.
§104. Action on plan.
The board of each corporation shall
adopt a plan of merger or exchange and
recommend the plan to the shareholders
of each corporation for approval.
Unless the charter provides otherwise,
shareholder approval is not required (1)
if a merger does not cause the corporate
existence to cease and (2) if a merger or
exchange does not affect the number of
shares held by a shareholder and does
not reduce the voting power of the
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§160. Corporation’s powers respecting
ownership, voting, etc., of its own stock; rights of
stock called fore redemption.
Generally, a corporation may purchase,
redeem, receive, take or otherwise
acquire, own and hold, sell, lend,
exchange, transfer or otherwise deal in
and with its own shares. However, a
corporation may not do so if the capital
is impaired or if such action will result in
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outstanding shares of the corporation or
the number of participating shares
outstanding.
§106. Abandonment of merger.
Anytime after a plan of merger or
exchange is adopted and approved but
before the merger or exchange has
become effective, the merger may be
abandoned without actions of the
shareholders or partners. Procedures
for abandonment may be set forth in
the plan of merger or exchange or
determined by the board or general
partners.
Prior to the effectiveness of the merger
or exchange, a statement executed on
behalf of each party to the merger or
exchange stating that the merger has
been abandoned must be filed with the
secretary of state.
§107. Articles of merger or exchange.
After a plan of merger or exchange is
adopted by the board and approved by
the shareholders, if required, articles of
merger or exchange shall be executed
and filed with the secretary of state on
behalf of each party to the merger.
§103. Share exchange.
A corporation may acquire all of the
outstanding shares of one or more
classes or series of another corporation
or units of a limited partnership in
exchange for shares, units, cash or other
property of a corporation or limited
partnership that is a party to the
exchange. A plan of exchange must set
forth the terms and conditions of the
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impairing capital, the corporation may
not purchase for more than the price at
which the share may be redeemed.
§253. Merger of parent corporation and
subsidiary or subsidiaries.
If at least ninety percent of the
outstanding shares of each class of the
stock of a corporation, of which there
are outstanding shares that would be
entitled to vote on a merger, is owned
by another corporation, the corporation
having such stock ownership may merge
the other corporation into itself or
merge or itself and one or more of the
other corporations into one or more of
the other corporations.
§259. Status, rights, liabilities, of constituent
and surviving or resulting corporations following
merger or consolidation.
When a merger or consolidation
becomes effective, the separate
existence of all the constituent
corporations, except the corporation
into which the constituent corporations
have been merged, shall cease and
become the new corporation. The
resulting corporation shall be subject to
all the restrictions, liabilities, and duties
of each constituent corporation so
merged, and the resulting corporation
shall be vested with all the rights,
privileges, powers, and franchises of
each constituent corporation.
§252. Merger or consolidation of domestic and
foreign corporations; service of process upon
surviving or resulting corporation.
Any one or more corporations of
Delaware may merge or consolidate
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exchange, as well as the basis of
exchanging shares or units.
§105. Merger of parent and subsidiary.
A parent corporation owning at least
ninety percent of a subsidiary
corporation or limited partnership may
merge the two entities without
shareholder approval if the board of the
parent corporation adopts a plan of
merger. A plan of merger must set
forth the terms and conditions of the
merger as well as the basis for
converting the shares or units.
§108. Effect of merger or share exchange.
When a merger becomes effective, the
surviving entity designated in the plan of
merger comes into existence. When an
exchange becomes effective, the
designated shares are exchanged and the
former holders are entitled only to those
rights provided in the plan of exchange.

§109. Merger or share exchange with foreign
corporation.
One or more foreign corporations may
merge or enter into a share exchange
with one or more domestic
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with one or more other corporations of
any other state into a single corporation.
§264. Merger or consolidation of domestic
corporation and limited liability company.
Any one or more corporations of
Delaware may merge or consolidate
with one or more limited liability
companies.
§266. Conversion of a domestic corporation to
other entities.
A corporation of Delaware may convert
to a limited liability company, a general
or limited partnership (including a
limited liability partnership and a limited
liability limited partnership), or business
trust of Delaware.
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corporations.
§110. Merger with foreign or domestic limited
liability company.
One or more domestic corporations
may merge with one or more foreign or
domestic limited liability companies.

§111. Conversion of a corporation to a limited
company.
A corporation may be converted to a
limited liability company if the board
adopts and all the shareholders approve
a plan of conversion. The plan must
contain the basis of converting shares
into membership interests and the terms
of the articles of organization of the
limited liability company. The
corporation shall file articles of
conversion with the secretary of state.
§266(d-f). The conversion of a
§112. Effect of conversion to a limited liability
corporation shall not be deemed to affect company.
any obligations or liabilities of the
When a conversion takes effect, all
corporation or personal liability of a
property, obligations and liabilities, and
person incurred prior to such
actions and proceedings pending against
conversion. After the time the
the converting corporation become that
conversion becomes effective the
of the converted entity. The conversion
corporation shall continue to exist as in
shall not be deemed a dissolution of the
the form of the type of entity to which
converting corporation. Shares of the
the corporation converted. Unless
converting corporation shall be
otherwise provided in a resolution of
cancelled, and the holders of the former
conversion, the converting corporation
shares shall be entitled only to rights as
shall not be required to wind up its
provided in the plan of conversion.
affairs or pay its liabilities and distribute
its assets, and the conversion shall not
constitute a dissolution.
§260. Powers of corporation surviving or
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resulting from merger or consolidation; issuance
of stock, bonds or other indebtedness.
§254. Merger or consolidation of domestic
corporation and joint-stock or other association.
§255. Merger or consolidation of domestic
nonstock corporations.
§256. Merger or consolidation of domestic and
foreign nonstock corporations; service of process
upon surviving or resulting corporation.
§257. Merger or consolidation of domestic stock
and nonstock corporations.
§258. Merger or consolidation of domestic and
foreign stock and nonstock corporations.
§261. Effect of merger upon pending actions.
§263. Merger or consolidation of domestic
corporation.
§265. Conversion of other entities to a domestic
corporation.
K. Sale of Assets
48-22-101 to 48-22-102.
§271. Sale, lease or exchange of assets;
§101. Sale of assets in regular course of business
consideration; procedure.
and mortgage of assets.
At a meeting of the board, any
A corporation may (1) dispose of
corporation may sell, lease, or exchange
property in the usual and regular course
all or substantially all of its property and of business; (2) encumber property
assets upon terms, conditions, and for
whether or not in the usual and regular
consideration as the board deems
course of business; or (3) transfer
expedient when authorized by a
property to a corporation of which it
resolution adopted by a majority of the
owns all shares. The board shall
stockholders.
determine the terms and conditions of
such a transaction, but shareholder
approval is required only if stated in the
charter.
§102. Sale of assets other than in regular course
of business.
A corporation may dispose of its
property in other than the regular course
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of business if the shareholders approve
of the transaction as submitted by the
board.

§272. Mortgage or pledge of assets.
L. Dissenters’ Rights
Part 1. Right to Dissent and Obtain
Payment for Shares
48-23-101 to 48-23-103.
§262. Appraisal rights.
§102. Right to dissent.
A stockholder is generally entitled to
A shareholder is entitled to dissent from
appraisal rights if required by the terms and obtain fair value of the
of an agreement of merger or
shareholder’s shares in the event of the
consolidation pursuant to the sections
following corporate actions: (1)
listed in the statute.
consummation of a plan of merger, plan
of share exchange, or a sale or exchange
of all the property of the corporation
other than in the usual course of
business; (2) an amendment of the
charter; or (3) any action taken pursuant
to a shareholder vote to the extent that
the shareholder is entitled to dissent and
obtain payment for shares held. If the
corporate action created the
shareholder’s entitlement, then the
shareholder may only dissent if the
action is unlawful or fraudulent. No
shareholder may dissent as to shares of
a security listed on an exchange.
§103. Dissent by nominees and beneficial
owners.
A record shareholder asserting
dissenters’ rights for fewer than all
shares registered in the shareholder’s
name, may do so only with respect to all
shares beneficially owned by a single
person by notifying the corporation of
the name and address of each beneficial
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owner. The beneficial shareholder must
submit written consent to dissent, and
may dissent only with respect to all
shares of the same class which are held
for the shareholder’s benefit.
Part 2. Procedure for Exercise of
Dissenters’ Rights
48-23-201 to 48-23-209.
§201. Notice of dissenters’ rights.
If a proposed corporate action
(“proposed action”) creating dissenters’
rights is submitted to a vote at a
shareholders’ meeting, the meeting
notice must indicate that and a copy of
this chapter must accompany the notice.
If a corporate action is taken without
submission to shareholders, the
corporation shall notify all shareholders
in writing that the action was taken,
along with the dissenters’ notice.

§262(d)(1). If the merger or consolidation
will be submitted to the stockholders for
a vote, the corporation shall send a
notice, including a copy of this section,
to the record stockholders not less than
twenty days before the meeting at which
the merger or consolidation will be
submitted for approval.
§262(d)(2). If the merger or consolidation
is approved without requirement for
stockholder approval, the corporation
must send a notice, including a copy of
this section, to stockholders entitled to
appraisal rights, either before or within
ten days after the merger or
consolidation.
§262(d)(1). If the merger or consolidation §202. Notice of intent to demand payment.
will be submitted to the stockholders for To assert dissenters’ rights against a
a vote, a stockholder must deliver written proposed action, a shareholder must
notice of intent to the corporation before deliver to the corporation written notice
the vote to demand appraisal rights. A
of the shareholders’ intent to demand
proxy or vote against merger or
payment for the shareholder’s shares
consolidation is not adequate to
and not vote in favor of the proposed
constitute demand.
action.
§262(d)(2). If the merger or consolidation
is approved without requirement for
stockholder approval, a stockholder must
demand appraisal within twenty days of
the mailing date of the notice.
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§262(d)(1). If the merger or consolidation
is submitted to the stockholders for a
vote, within ten days after the merger or
consolidation becomes effective, the
surviving corporation shall notify each
stockholder, who properly notified the
corporation of intent to demand
appraisal and did not vote in favor of the
merger or consolidation, of the date the
merger or consolidation becomes
effective.

§262(e). Within 120 days after the
effective date of the merger or
consolidation, either the corporation or a
stockholder, who properly notified the
corporation of intent to demand
appraisal, may file a petition in the Court
of Chancery demanding a determination
of the value of the stock of all such
stockholders. Within sixty days of the
effective date of the merger or
consolidation, a stockholder may
withdraw demand and accept the terms

145

TENNESSEE BUSINESS
CORPORATION ACT
§203. Dissenters’ notice.
If the shareholders authorize a proposed
action, the corporation must provide a
dissenters’ notice to all shareholders
who submitted notice of intent to
demand payment no later than ten days
after the action is authorized. The
notice must specify the procedures and
terms of payment for the dissenters’
shares including a date by which the
corporation must receive the payment
demand.
§207. Failure to take action.
If the corporation does not effectuate
the proposed action within two months
after the date set to demand payment,
the corporation shall return the
deposited certificates and release
restrictions on uncertificated shares. If
the corporation effectuates the
proposed action after return of
certificates and release of restrictions,
the corporation must repeat the
payment demand procedure beginning
with the dissenters’ notice.
§204. Duty to demand payment.
To be entitled to payment for shares,
shareholders, who received a dissenters’
notice, must demand payment, certify
whether the shareholder acquired shares
before the date in the notice, and
deposit the certificates in accordance
with the terms of the notice. After the
shares are deposited with the
corporation, the shareholder retains
rights as a shareholder until the
proposed action is effectuated. A
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offered in the plan of merger or
consolidation.
§262(g). The Court shall determine the
stockholders entitled to appraisal and
determine the fair value of the shares.
§262(k). After the effective date of the
merger or consolidation, a stockholder
who has demanded appraisal is not
entitled to vote shares for any purpose
and is not entitled to receive payment of
dividends or other distributions.

§262(i). The Court shall direct the
payment of the fair value of the shares
plus interest from the corporation to the
stockholders.
§262(j). The costs of the proceeding may
be determined by the Court and taxed as
the Court deems equitable.
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shareholder may not withdraw a
demand for payment unless the
corporation consents.
§208. After-acquired shares.
A corporation may elect to withhold
payment from a dissenter unless the
dissenter was the beneficial owner of
the shares before the date set for
announcement of the proposed action
to the media or shareholders. A
corporation shall pay fair value plus
accrued interest to dissenters from
whom payment is withheld after the
proposed action is effectuated.
§206. Payment.
The corporation shall pay each
dissenter, who complied with the duty
to demand payment, the fair value of
each share plus accrued interest at the
earlier of the date the proposed action is
effectuated or the date payment demand
is received. The corporation must
provide financial statements, a statement
of the estimation of fair value, an
explanation of the interest calculation,
and a copy of this chapter.
§209. Procedure if shareholder dissatisfied with
payment or offer.
Under circumstances described in the
statute, a dissenter may demand
payment of the dissenter’s estimate of
fair value or reject the corporation’s
offer. The dissenter must notify the
corporation of a demand within one
month after the corporation’s offer or
such right to payment is waived.
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§262(l). The shares of the surviving
corporation which would have become
shares of the stockholders demanding
appraisal will have the status of
authorized and unissued shares of the
corporation.

§327. Stockholder’s derivative action; allegation
of stock ownership.
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§205. Share restrictions.
A corporation may restrict the transfer
of uncertificated shares from the date
demand for their payment is received
until the proposed corporate action is
effectuated, but the person for whom
the dissenters’ rights are asserted as to
the uncertificated shares retains all other
shareholder rights until the proposed
action is effectuated.
Part 3. Judicial Appraisal of Shares
48-23-301 to 48-23-302.
§301. Court action.
If a demand for payment from a
dissatisfied shareholder remains
unsettled, the corporation must
petition a court (“appraisal
proceeding”) to determine fair value
and interest within two months after
receiving the payment demand or pay
the shareholder the amount demanded.
§302. Court costs and counsel fees.
In an appraisal proceeding, the court
shall determine all costs of the
proceeding and assess the costs against
the corporation. The court may assess
costs against dissenters who acted
arbitrarily, vexatiously, or in bad faith.
The court has discretion to assess fees
and expenses as provided in the
statute.
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M. Dissolution
Part 1. Voluntary Dissolution
48-24-101 to 48-24-108.
§274. Dissolution before issuance of shares or
§101. Dissolution by incorporators or initial
beginning of business; procedure.
directors.
If a corporation has not issued shares or A corporation that has not issued shares
commenced the business for which the
or commenced business may be
corporation was organized, a majority of dissolved by a majority of the
the incorporators, or, if elected or
incorporators or initial directors by
named in the certificate of
filing articles of dissolution and
incorporation, a majority of directors,
termination.
may dissolve the corporation by filing a
certificate, executed and acknowledged
by a majority of the incorporators or
directors.
§275. Dissolution generally; procedure.
§102. Dissolution by board of directors and
If all the stockholders consent in
shareholders.
writing, the stockholders may authorize
A corporation may be dissolved
the dissolution of a corporation without voluntarily by the shareholders as an
action by the board. The board may
action without a meeting. The board
adopt a resolution to dissolve the
may propose dissolution for submission
corporation by a majority of the board
to the shareholders with or without
and provide notice of a meeting to take
condition. The corporation must notify
action on the resolution to the
all shareholders of the meeting and must
stockholders entitled to vote. If a
state that the purpose of the meeting is
majority of the stockholders vote for the to consider dissolution. The
resolution, a certificate of dissolution
shareholders must approve of
shall be executed, acknowledged, and
dissolution by a majority of all the votes
filed with the Secretary of State.
entitled to be case unless otherwise
specified in the charter or by the board.
§103. Articles of dissolution.
The board shall file articles of
dissolution with the secretary of state
after dissolution is authorized.
§311. Revocation of voluntary dissolution.
§104. Revocation of dissolution.
A corporation may revoke a dissolution
A corporation may revoke dissolution
effected by the board and stockholders
any time prior to filing articles of
within three years after the dissolution,
termination of corporate existence with
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or for a longer period as directed by the
Court of Chancery. The board shall
adopt a resolution and a majority of the
stockholders shall vote for revocation of
dissolution. A certificate of revocation
of dissolution shall be executed,
acknowledged, and filed.

§278. Continuation of corporation after
dissolution for purposes of suit and winding up
affairs.
All corporations, whether dissolved or
expired, shall continue for a term of
three years from such expiration or
dissolution or longer as determined by
the Court of Chancery. The
corporation shall continue to exist for
the purpose of prosecuting and
defending suits by or against the
corporation and enabling them to
gradually settle and close their business,
but not for continuing the business for
which the corporation was organized.
§280. Notice to claimants; filing of claims.
After a corporation has been dissolved,
the corporation or successor entity may
give notice to require that all persons
with claims against the corporation
present the claims in accordance with
the notice. The statute lists notice
requirements for content and
publication. A claim is barred if
claimant does not meet the deadline to
present the claim.
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the secretary of state. Shareholders may
authorize revocation in the same
manner as dissolution may be
authorized, unless the authorization for
dissolution allowed revocation by the
board alone. The corporation shall file
articles of revocation of dissolution after
revocation is authorized. Revocation is
effective as of the effective date of
dissolution.
§105. Effect of dissolution.
A dissolved corporation continues to
exist, but may conduct business only to
wind up and liquidate.

§106. Known claims against dissolved
corporations.
A dissolved corporation may dispose of
known claims by notifying claimants of
the dissolution in writing. The statute
lists notice requirements, including a
deadline by which the dissolved
corporation must receive a claim. A
claim is barred if claimant does not meet
the deadline or the claimant does not
commence a proceeding to enforce a
claim rejected by the corporation within
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three months of rejection.
§107. Unknown claims against dissolved
corporation.
A dissolved corporation may also
publish notice of dissolution requesting
persons with claims against the
corporation present the claims. The
statute lists notice requirements. A
claim may be enforced against a
dissolved corporation to the extent of
undistributed assets or, if assets are
liquidated, against a shareholder as
provided in the statute. If notice is
published and a claimant does not
commence a proceeding to enforce the
claim within two years of publication,
claims may be barred as provided by the
statute.
§108. Articles of termination of corporate
existence.
A corporation shall file articles of
termination of corporate existence after
all assets are distributed to creditors and
shareholders and voluntary dissolution
proceedings have not been revoked.

§279. Trustees or receivers for dissolved
corporations; appointment; powers; duties.
When a corporation is dissolved, upon
application of any creditor, stockholder,
or director, the Court of Chancery may
(1) appoint a director to be trustee, (2)
appoint a receiver.
§312. Renewal, revival, extension and
restoration of certificate of incorporation.
A corporation whose certificate of
incorporation has become inoperative by

Part 2. Administrative Dissolution
48-24-201 to 48-24-205
§201. Grounds for administrative dissolution.
The secretary of state may commence a
proceeding to administratively dissolve a
corporation for the reasons listed in the
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the Court of Chancery, may procure an
extension, restoration, renewal, or revival
of its certificate of incorporation.
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statute including failure of the
corporation to deliver a properly
completed annual report within two
months after due and the corporation is
without a registered agent or office in
Tennessee for two months or more.
§202. Procedure for and effect of administrative
dissolution.
The secretary of state shall serve the
corporation with notice of a
determination for administrative
dissolution by first class mail. If the
corporation does not correct each
ground for dissolution within two
months of service, the secretary of state
shall dissolve the corporation by filing a
certificate of dissolution. An
administratively dissolved corporation
continues in corporate existence but
may conduct business only to wind up
and liquidate.
§203. Reinstatement following administrative
dissolution.
A corporation administratively dissolved
may apply to the secretary of state for
reinstatement stating that the ground for
dissolution did not exist or has been
eliminated. The secretary of state shall
cancel the certificate of dissolution and
file a certificate of reinstatement after
determination that the information in
the application is true.
§204. Appeal from denial of reinstatement.
If the secretary of state denies an
application for reinstatement, the
corporation may appeal the denial to the
chancery court of Davidson County
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proceedings.
The Court of Chancery shall have
jurisdiction to revoke or forfeit the
charter of any corporation for abuse,
misuse, or nonuse of corporation
powers, privileges, or franchises.
The Court of Chancery shall have the
power, by appointment of receivers or
otherwise, to administer and wind up the
affairs of any corporation whose charter
shall be revoked or forfeited by a court.
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within thirty days of service of the
notice of denial. The court may
summarily order the secretary of state to
reinstate or may take other appropriate
action.
§205. Articles of termination following
administrative dissolution or revocation.
An administratively dissolved
corporation or a corporation whose
charter is revoked may terminate
corporate existence by filing articles of
termination following administrative
dissolution or revocation.
Part 3. Judicial Dissolution
48-24-301 to 48-24-304
§301. Grounds for judicial dissolution.
A court may dissolve a corporation in a
proceeding by the attorney general and
reporter, a shareholder, or a creditor.
Petitioners must establish grounds as
listed in the statute.
§302. Procedure for judicial dissolution.
Venue lies in Davidson County for a
proceeding by the attorney general and
reporter; venue lies in the county of the
corporation’s principal office for a
proceeding brought by a shareholder or
creditor. A court in such a proceeding
may take actions to preserve the
corporate assets where located and carry
on the business of the corporation until
a full hearing may be held. The
petitioner in such a proceeding shall
execute and file a bond to cover
defendant’s probable costs in an amount
determined by the court.
§303. Receivership or custodianship.
A court in a judicial dissolution
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proceeding may appoint a receiver to
wind up and liquidate the corporation or
a custodian to manage the business and
affairs of the corporation.
§304. Decree of dissolution.
If a court determines that a ground
exists for judicial dissolution, the court
may enter a decree dissolving the
corporation, and the clerk of the court
shall file the decree with the secretary
of state. The court shall then direct the
winding up and liquidation of the
corporation and the notification of
claimants.

§273. Dissolution of joint venture corporation
having two stockholders.
§276. Dissolution of nonstock corporation;
procedure.
§281. Payment and distribution to claimants
and stockholders.
§282. Liability of stockholders of dissolved
corporations.
N. Foreign Corporations
Part 1. Certificate of Authority
48-25-101 to 48-25-110.
§371. Definition; qualification to do business in §101. Authority to transact business required.
State; procedure.
A foreign corporation, except a foreign
A corporation organized under the laws
insurance company, may not transact
of a jurisdiction other than Delaware
business in Tennessee without a
shall not do business in Delaware until
certificate of authority. The statute
the corporation files a certificate
lists activities allowed without a
evidencing existence and a statement
certificate of authority including
setting forth the name and purpose of
maintaining, defending, or settling a
the corporation.
claim, proceeding or dispute and
holding board meetings or shareholder
meetings.
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§102. Consequences of transacting business
without authority.
A foreign corporation transacting
business in Tennessee without a
certificate of authority may not maintain
a proceeding in any court in Tennessee.
A court may stay a proceeding
commenced by a foreign corporation to
determine whether a certificate of
authority is required. A foreign
corporation that conducts unauthorized
business in Tennessee shall be liable to
the state in an amount equal to treble
the amount of fees, penalties, taxes, and
interest imposed by the state had the
corporation obtained a certificate of
authority. A foreign corporation must
pay such amounts before an application
for a certificate of authority may be
filed.
§103. Application for certificate of authority.
A foreign corporation must file an
application for a certificate of authority
with the secretary of state that meets the
requirements listed in the statute,
accompanied by a certificate of
existence, authenticated nor more than
two months before filing the
application, by the secretary of state
where the corporation is incorporated.
§105. Effect of certificate of authority.
A certificate of authority authorizes a
foreign corporation to transact
business in Tennessee subject to
revocation. A foreign corporation with
a certificate of authority is subject to
the same duties and liabilities of a
domestic corporation.
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§372. Additional requirements in case of change §104. Amended certificate of authority.
of name, change of business purpose or merger or A foreign corporation authorized to
consolidation.
conduct business in Tennessee must
A foreign corporation admitted to do
obtain an amended certificate of
business in Delaware shall file a
authority if it changes its corporate
certificate with the Secretary of State if it
name, duration, or state or country of
changes its corporate name or changes
incorporation by following the same
the business proposed to conduct in
procedures required to obtain an
Delaware.
original certificate of authority.
§106. Corporate name of a foreign corporation.
Generally, a foreign corporation may
obtain a certificate of authority under a
corporate name or an assumed name
that meets the requirements for the
name of a domestic corporation.
§377. Change of registered agent.
§107. Registered office and registered agent of
A foreign corporation qualified to do
foreign corporation.
business in Delaware may change its
A foreign corporation authorized to
registered agent by filing a certificate
transact business in Tennessee shall
with the Secretary of State. The
continuously maintain a registered office
registered agent of a foreign corporation
and registered agent in Tennessee.
may resign by filing a signed statement
§108. Change of registered office or registered
with the Secretary of State, with a
agent of foreign corporation.
representation that a written notice of
A foreign corporation authorized to
resignation was given to the corporation
transact business in Tennessee may
at least thirty days prior to the filing of
change its registered office or agent by
the statement.
filing a statement of change with the
secretary of state.
§109. Resignation of registered agent of foreign
corporation.
The registered agent of a foreign
corporation may resign the
appointment by filing with the
secretary of state an original statement
of resignation and certification that the
agent sent a copy to the corporation by
certified mail.

156

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
§376. Service of process upon qualified foreign
corporations.
Service of process upon a foreign
corporation may be served on the
registered agent of the corporation. If
there is no registered agent, then service
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[Vol. 5

TENNESSEE BUSINESS
CORPORATION ACT
§110. Service on foreign corporation.
The registered agent of a foreign
corporation authorized to transact
business in Tennessee is the
corporation’s agent for service or
process, notice, or demand.

Part 2. Withdrawal
48-25-201.
§381. Withdrawal of foreign corporation from
§201. Withdrawal of foreign corporation.
State; procedure; service of process on Secretary of
A foreign corporation authorized to
State.
transact business in Tennessee may not
A foreign corporation qualified to do
withdraw form Tennessee without a
business in Delaware may surrender its
certificate of withdrawal. The
authority by filing a certificate stating
requirements for application for a
that the corporation surrenders authority,
certificate of withdrawal are listed in
a copy of a certificate of dissolution, or a
the statute.
copy of an order of dissolution made by
a court. The Secretary of State shall issue
certificates evidencing the surrender of
authority.
Part 3. Revocation of Certificate of
Authority
48-25-301 to 48-25-305.
§374. Annual report.
§301. Grounds for revocation.
On or before June 30 each year, a foreign
The secretary of state may commence a
corporation doing business in Delaware
proceeding to revoke a certificate of
shall file an annual report with the
authority for the grounds listed in the
Secretary of State.
statute including failure to properly
deliver an annual report two months
after due and the corporation is
without a registered agent or office in
Tennessee for two months or more.
§375. Failure to file report.
§302. Procedure for and effect of revocation.
If a foreign corporation fails to file an
The secretary of state shall serve the
annual report within any two-year period,
foreign corporation with notice of a
the Secretary of State may make an
determination for revocation of a
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the corporation to do business in
Delaware.
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certificate of authority by first class
mail. If the foreign corporation does
not correct each ground for revocation
within two months of service, the
secretary of state shall dissolve the
corporation by filing a certificate of
revocation. The authority of a foreign
corporation to transact business in
Tennessee ceases upon revocation, but
the revocation does not terminate the
authority of the registered agent.
§303. Reinstatement following administrative
revocation.
A foreign corporation whose certificate
of authority is administratively revoked
may apply to the secretary of state for
reinstatement stating that the ground for
revocation did not exist or has been
eliminated. The secretary of state shall
reinstate the certificate of authority and
file a certificate of authority after
determination that the information in
the application is true.
§304. Appeal from denial of reinstatement.
If the secretary of state denies a foreign
corporation’s application for
reinstatement following administrative
revocation, the foreign corporation may
appeal the denial to the chancery court
of Davidson County within one month
of service of the notice of denial. The
court may summarily order the secretary
of state to reinstate the revoked
corporation or may take other
appropriate action.
§305. Certificate of withdrawal following
administrative revocation.
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A foreign corporation whose certificate
of authority is revoked may withdraw
from the state by filing an application
for a certificate of withdrawal
following administrative revocation of
the certificate of authority.

§379. Banking powers denied.
§380. Foreign corporation as fiduciary in this
State.
§382. Service of process on nonqualifying foreign
corporations.
§383. Actions by and against unqualified
foreign corporations.
O. Records and Reports
Part 1. Records
48-26-101 to 48-26-104.
§224. Form of records.
§101. Corporate records.
Any records maintained by a corporation
A corporation shall maintain (1)
in the regular course of business may be
permanent records of minutes of all
kept in any manner that may be
shareholder and board meetings, all
converted into clearly legible paper form
actions taken at such meetings, and all
within a reasonable time of a request by a
actions taken by committees of the
person entitled to inspect such records.
board; (2) accounting records; and (3)
records of shareholders in written
form. A corporation shall keep copies,
at the principal office, of the charter,
bylaws, and board resolutions creating
shares, meetings minutes, written
communication to shareholders, names
and addresses of directors and officers,
and the most recent annual report.
§220(b). Inspection of books and records.
§102. Inspection of records by shareholders.
Upon written demand under oath
If a shareholder provides written
directed to the corporation’s principal
notice of demand five business days in
place of business, any stockholder shall
advance, the shareholder is entitled to
have the right to inspect, copy, and
inspect and copy the records required
extract from the corporation’s stock
to be kept at the principal office during
ledger, list of stockholders, and other
regular business hours. Shareholders
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hours for any proper purpose.

§220(b). Inspection of books and records.
If the demand is accompanied by a
power of attorney, an attorney or agent
may seek the right to inspection on
behalf of a stockholder.
§220(c).
If the corporation fails to reply to
demand within five business days after
the demand has been made, the
stockholder may apply to the Court of
Chancery for an order to compel
inspection. The Court is vested with
exclusive jurisdiction to determine
whether the person seeking the right of
inspection is entitled to the right. If the
stockholder seeks only to inspect the
stock ledger and the stockholder list, the
corporation bears the burden to prove an
improper purpose and the court may
summarily order the corporation to
permit inspection. If the stockholder
seeks to inspect the corporation’s books
and records, the stockholder must
establish compliance with demand
requirements and proper purpose. The
Court has discretion to fashion terms
upon which the corporation must permit
inspection.
A director shall have the same right of
inspection, and the Court of Chancery is
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have rights to inspection of other
documents as provided in the statute.
These rights of inspection may not be
abolished or limited by the charter or
bylaws.
§103. Scope of inspection right.
A shareholder’s agent or attorney has
the same inspection and copying rights
as the shareholder. The right to copy
includes the right to receive copies.
The corporation may impose a
reasonable charge for copies.
§104. Court-ordered inspection.
Upon application by a shareholder, a
court may summarily order inspection
and copying of records demanded at
the corporation’s expense if a
corporation does not honor a
shareholder’s right to inspect and copy
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Part 2. Reports
48-26-201 to 48-26-203.
§201. Financial statements for shareholders.
A corporation shall prepare annual
financial statements that include a
balance sheet, an income statement,
and a statement of changes in
shareholders’ equity. If requested in
writing by the shareholder, the
corporation shall furnish the
statements within one month after
notice of request.
§202. Other reports to shareholders.
The corporation shall report in writing
to the shareholders with or before the
notice of the next meeting (1) if a
corporation indemnifies or advances
expenses to a director, the corporation
or (2) if a corporation issues or
authorizes the issuance of shares for
promissory notes or for promises to
render services in the future.
§203. Annual report for secretary of state.
Each domestic corporation and foreign
corporation authorized to do business
in Tennessee shall file an annual report
with the secretary of state on or before
the first day of the fourth month
following the close of the corporation’s
fiscal year.
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P. Miscellaneous
Subchapter XI.
Insolvency; Receivers and Trustees
§291. Receivers for insolvent corporations;
appointment and powers.
§292. Title to property; filing order of
appointment; exception.
§293. Notice to stockholders and creditors.
§294. Receivers or trustees; inventory; list of
debts and report.
§295. Creditors’ proofs of claims; when barred;
notice.
§296. Adjudication of claims; appeal.
§297. Sale of perishable or deteriorating
property.
§298. Compensation; costs and expense of
receiver or trustee.
§299. Substitution of trustee or receiver as
party; abatement of actions.
§300. Employee’s lien for wages when
corporation insolvent.
§301. Discontinuance of liquidation.
§302. Compromise or arrangement between
corporation and creditors or stockholders.
§303. Reorganization under a statute of the
United States; effectuation.
Subchapter XIII. Suits Against
Corporations, Directors, Officers, or
Stockholders
§325. Actions against officers, directors, or
stockholders to enforce liability of corporation;
unsatisfied judgment against corporation.
§326. Action by officer, director or stockholder
against corporation for corporate debt paid.
§328. Effect of liability of corporation on
impairment of certain transactions.
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§329. Defective organization of corporation as
defense.
§330. Usury; pleading by corporation.
Subchapter XIV.
Close Corporations; Special
Provisions
§341 to §356
Subchapter XVI.
Domestication and Transfer
§388. Domestication of non-United States
corporations.
§389. Temporary transfer of domicile into this
State.
§390. Transfer or continuance of domestic
corporations.
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